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This dissertation contains two essays that use empirical techniques to shed light 
on open questions in the asset pricing literature. In the first essay, I investigate whether 
foreign institutional investors affect stock liquidity in domestic equity markets. The 
evidence indicates that stocks with higher foreign institutional ownership subsequently 
experience higher liquidity. However, it is difficult to interpret the causal relation of this 
finding because institutional investors self-select into more liquid stocks. To solve this 
problem, I exploit a provision in the 2003 US dividend tax cut which extends tax-relief to 
dividends from US tax-treaty countries but not to dividends from non-treaty countries. 
This natural experiment suggests a causal link between foreign institutional investors and 
liquidity. Consistent with the predictions of theoretical models, I find that liquidity 
improves due to foreign institutional investors increasing information competition. 
In the second essay, I introduce a new measure of difference of opinion using 
mutual fund portfolio weights to test prominent competing theories of the effect of 
heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices. The over-valuation theory (Miller (1977)) proposes 
that in the presence of short-sale constraints stock prices reflects only the view of 
optimistic investors which implies lower subsequent returns. Alternatively, neo-classical 
asset pricing models (Williams (1977), Merton (1987)) suggest that differences of 
opinions indicate high levels of information uncertainty or risk which implies higher 
 vii 
expected returns. My initial result finds no support for the over-valuation theory.  Instead, 
the measure used in this study finds that high differences of opinion stocks weakly 
outperform low differences of opinion stocks by 2.42% annually which is more 
consistent with the information uncertainty explanation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this dissertation, I study two open questions in the asset pricing literature using 
empirical techniques. In Chapter 2, I tackle the question of whether foreign investors 
affect liquidity in the domestic stock market. This is an important issue because liquidity 
is an essential attribute of any financial market. A popular perception is that foreign 
investors may destabilize markets. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, regulators 
and policy makers set capital controls on foreign investment due to concerns that foreign 
investors may harm market quality.1  
I find that foreign institutional investors improve liquidity in domestic equity 
markets. This implies that foreign participation may be beneficial to the quality of the 
domestic markets.  However, it is difficult to draw causal inferences about this relation 
because foreign investors are primarily institutional investors who are known to self-
select into liquid stocks. For researchers, this creates an identification problem.  To 
disentangle the direction of causation between institutional investors and liquidity, I use a 
difference-in-difference approach that exploits a provision in the 2003 United States 
dividend tax cut. This provision extends the US dividend tax cut (15%) to international 
dividends but only if the dividends are from companies located in countries that have an 
existing tax treaty with the United States. This creates an incentive for US tax-sensitive 
institutional investors to reallocate their portfolios towards dividend-paying stocks 
domiciled in tax-treaty countries but not towards stocks in non-tax treaty countries. This 
                                               
1 The World Bank and the IMF (2010) have advised international regulators to utilize capital controls to 
curb speculative ‘hot money’ inflows (“World Bank says Asia may need capital controls”, Bloomberg 
News, Nov. 8, 2010). Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand recently implemented policies 
targeted at regulating foreign capital flows (“Hot money may overheat emerging markets,” USA Today, 
Nov. 18, 2010).  Financial regulators of developed exchanges, notably Jean-Claude Trichet, ex-governor of 
the Banque de France, have previously expressed similar concerns (Trichet (2001)). 
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reallocation creates an exogenous shock in foreign institutional investor holdings that is 
likely unrelated to the liquidity of the stock. This natural experiment helps to separate the 
confounding effects of self-selection and causality. The findings suggest that the 
relationship between foreign institutional investors and stock liquidity is indeed causal. 
This first essay makes several contributions to the growing literature on the 
impact of financial integration.2  First, I provide new evidence of a causal link between 
foreign institutional investors and domestic stock liquidity. Highlighting this facet of 
international capital flows may be useful for regulators and international policymakers 
when considering foreign capital restrictions. Second, unlike previous studies that focus 
on market liberalization periods when markets first opened to foreign investment, this 
study shows that the benefits of foreign investors can continue to accrue post-
liberalization. Third, I show that liquidity improves not only in emerging markets but that 
developed markets can also benefit from foreign institutional capital flow. 
In Chapter 3, I address the open debate surrounding the relationship between 
differences of opinion and asset prices. A defining characteristic of financial markets is 
that agents often hold different opinions even when they possess common information. 
Recent theoretical models that include heterogeneous beliefs have made promising 
developments that shed light on the behavior of asset prices. Yet, empirically it has 
proved difficult to find reliable proxies for differences of opinions amongst investors. 
I bridge this gap in the literature by introducing a new measure of differences of 
opinion based on the portfolio holdings of mutual fund managers. The beliefs of mutual 
fund managers can be elicited by observing how they deviate their portfolios from their 
                                               
2 Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005, 2009) and Henry (2000a) find improvements in economic growth, 
investment opportunities and productivity from market integration.   Stulz (1999), Henry (2000b), Errunza 
and Miller (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find a decrease in the cost of capital after market 
liberalization. 
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benchmark portfolio weights. By combining these deviations, I create a measure of 
differences of opinion based on mutual fund manager disagreement.  This new measure is 
used test prominent competing theories of the effect of heterogeneous beliefs on asset 
prices.  
There are three general classes of heterogeneous belief models that offer testable 
empirical implications. First, Miller (1977) argues that in the presence of short-sale 
constraints, stock price reflects only the view of optimistic investors.  This ‘over-
valuation’ theory implies that stocks with high differences of opinion would experience 
lower subsequent returns. Second, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Hong and Stein 
(2003) propose that the existence of rational arbitrageurs or market makers that are able 
to short sell would eliminate this mis-pricing. Prices would remain unbiased and 
differences of opinion would not be related to future returns. A third theory first proposed 
in Williams (1977) suggests that differences of opinions likely indicate information 
uncertainty or parameter risk which implies higher expected returns.  
Using the mutual fund manager disagreement measure, my initial result finds no 
support for the over-valuation theory. Instead, the measure used in this study finds that 
high differences of opinion stocks weakly outperform low differences of opinion stocks 




Chapter 2:  Do Foreign Investors Improve Stock Liquidity?  Evidence 
from Institutional Holdings 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Do foreign investors affect stock liquidity in the domestic market? This is an 
important question in light of the recent policy debate on the destabilizing effects of 
foreign investors. The World Bank and the IMF (2010) have advised international 
regulators to utilize capital controls to curb speculative ‘hot money’ inflows.3  Despite the 
vital importance of this issue, there is little comprehensive evidence on the relationship 
between foreign investors and domestic stock liquidity.4 Foreign capital flows originate 
predominantly from financial institutions whose trading behavior could hamper liquidity 
by overwhelming market maker inventories.5  On the other hand, there are plausible 
reasons to believe that foreign institutional investors may improve liquidity. For example, 
they may increase uninformed order flow (‘noise’ trading), lower information 
asymmetries or use sophisticated trading systems that are optimized to mitigate market 
impact.6   
In this study, I find that foreign institutional investors improve liquidity in 
domestic equity markets. While it is straightforward to establish a correlation between 
                                               
3 (“World Bank says Asia may need capital controls”, Bloomberg News, Nov. 8, 2010).  Brazil, China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand recently implemented policies targeted at regulating foreign capital 
flows (“Hot money may overheat emerging markets,” USA Today, Nov. 18, 2010).  Financial regulators of 
developed exchanges, notably Jean-Claude Trichet, ex-governor of the Banque de France, have previously 
expressed similar concerns (Trichet (2001)). 
4 Prior research on financial globalization and liquidity has either concentrated on country-level liquidity 
(Bekaert and Harvey (2002)) or has focused in a particular country (Rhee and Wang (2009)). 
5 Institutions tend to execute larger orders (Kraus and Stoll (1972), herd into stocks and industries 
(Lakonishok et al (1992), Sias (1997), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Wermers (1999), Choi and 
Sias (2010)), and destabilize prices (Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010)).  Cross-border portfolio flows are 
also known to display trend-chasing behavior (Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2004) and Froot and Ramadorai 
(2008)). 
6 Studies in U.S. domestic market find that the increase in algorithmic trading systems has improved 
liquidity (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010)).  Other studies find that hedge funds tend to be 
liquidity providers in the U.S. market (Aragon and Strahan (2010), Ajylha, Rinne, and Suominen (2011)). 
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foreign institutional investors and liquidity, it is challenging to show a causal relation 
because institutions may prefer to hold more liquid stocks.7  For researchers, this creates 
an identification problem.  Prior studies on the impact of institutional investors on stock 
liquidity rely on cross-sectional variation in institutional participation or Granger 
causality tests for identification.8 The temporal nature of these tests alleviates some of the 
concern that institutions self-select into more liquid stocks but leaves open the lingering 
possibility of an omitted variable that determines both current institutional ownership and 
future stock liquidity.  For example, institutional investors have an incentive to search for 
stocks with high liquidity in the future in the event that they need to liquidate their 
position.  If such omitted variables exist, the endogeneity problem remains unresolved. 
To disentangle the direction of causation between institutional investors and 
liquidity, I use a difference-in-difference approach that exploits a provision in the 2003 
United States dividend tax cut.  Specifically, this provision extends the US dividend tax 
cut (15%) internationally but only to a subset of dividends from companies located in 
certain foreign countries that had an existing tax treaty with the United States.  Desai and 
Dharmapala (2010) find that this created an incentive for US capital to reallocate towards 
dividend-paying stocks domiciled in tax-treaty countries but not towards stocks in non-
tax treaty countries.  Using this natural experiment, I find that liquidity improved more in 
dividend-paying stocks of treaty countries compared to non-treaty countries, suggesting 
that the relationship between foreign institutional investors and stock liquidity is causal. 
My empirical approach uses a 10 year panel (2000 to 2009) of foreign 
institutional investor stock holdings from the Factset/Lionshares database to examine 
                                               
7 Institutions seek to minimize trading costs and the price impact of their trades.  Gompers and Metrick 
(2001) find that institutions exhibit a preference for liquidity. 
8 For US studies see Agarwal (2007) and Liu (2008). Aragon and Strahan (2009) use the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to funding costs to show that hedge funds act as liquidity 
providers. 
 6 
liquidity across 21 developed and 13 emerging countries.9  The comprehensive stock 
level nature of this database affords more powerful tests because it captures within 
country variation in both foreign institutional ownership and liquidity. I show that stocks 
with increased participation by foreign institutional investors subsequently experience 
higher liquidity as measured using Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure (ILLIQ).10  
The effect is incremental to the presence of domestic institutions and exists in both 
developed and emerging markets. Under various econometric specifications, a one 
percent increase in foreign institutional share ownership creates a 1.4 to 3 percent 
reduction in price impact. 
There are various channels through which foreign institutional investors may 
affect liquidity. They make invest on behalf of their clients for risk-sharing and portfolio 
diversification benefits. In this instance, they act as traditional noise-traders, providing 
liquidity to markets through their hedge trading. Foreign investment also tends to attract 
heightened scrutiny and media coverage. This may create an ‘attention effect’ by 
attracting additional noise traders to the stock (Merton (1987)). Alternatively, liquidity 
may improve through increased information competition amongst informed agents.  The 
‘information competition’ hypothesis predicts that if foreign institutions are informed,11 
                                               
9 The data are collected from country regulatory filings or directly from the exchanges.  The holdings in 
this database represent nearly 40% of the world stock market capitalization (Ferreira and Matos (2008) and 
Ferreira, Matos and Pereira (2009)). 
10 ILLIQ is a popular and relatively accurate measure of the price impact component of liquidity when 
estimated over longer time horizons (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009)).  I find similar results using 
the following measures:  LOT transactions cost measure in Lesmond, Ogden, Trzcinka (1999), percentage 
of zero trading days in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007), and the high-low price spread measure 
created in Corwin and Schultz (2010). 
11 Financial institutions are generally regarded as informed/sophisticated traders.  But the question of 
whether foreign investors have informational advantages remains an open debate. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000), Seasholes (2004), Froot and Ramadorai (2008) find that foreign investor appear to be informed on 
their trades.   Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005), Kang and Stulz (1997), and Hau (2001) find evidence in Korea, 
Japan and Germany that foreign investors tend to lose out on their trades.  In a study of the data used in this 
study, foreign-based money managers are found to outperform local-based money managers (Ferreira, 
Matos and Pereira (2009)). 
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their entry into new markets may increase the competition over trading profits with 
existing informed traders. In Kyle (1985), informed agents optimally withhold 
information which can result in lower levels of liquidity.  The arrival of new informed 
agents can spur a competitive equilibrium where information is more quickly impounded 
into prices leading to better informational efficiency and higher liquidity (Subrahmanyam 
(1991a), Foster and Viswanathan (1996)).12  
I test the information competition channel from two directions. First, I use a 
variety of measures found in prior studies that proxy for informed trading by institutional 
investors (geographical proximity, sophistication, and institution type). The results 
indicate that the positive effect of foreign institutional investors on stock market liquidity 
originates primarily from institutions that are likely to be informed. Second, I examine 
the marginal effect of foreign institutional investors on stock liquidity across different 
information environments. These results also support the information competition 
channel. Specifically, foreign institutional investors generate greater improvements in 
liquidity in opaque information environments where the prevalence of informed traders is 
likely to be greater. 
This study makes several key contributions to the growing literature on financial 
integration.13  First, I provide new evidence of a causal link between foreign institutional 
investors and domestic stock liquidity. Highlighting this benefit of international capital 
flows may be useful for regulators and international policymakers when setting capital 
controls and restrictions on foreign investors. Second, unlike previous studies that focus 
                                               
12 Foreign institutions may also appear informed by engaging in more sophisticated liquidity provision 
strategies.  Mutual funds have been shown to capture liquidity premiums by providing liquidity to 
impatient traders (Da, Gao, Jagannathan (2010), Zhang (2010)).  
13 Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005, 2009) and Henry (2000a) find improvements in economic growth, 
investment opportunities and productivity from market integration.   Stulz (1999), Henry (2000b), Errunza 
and Miller (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find a decrease in the cost of capital after market 
liberalization. 
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on market liberalization periods when markets were first opened to foreign investment, 
this study shows that the benefits of foreign investors can continue to accrue post-
liberalization. Third, I show that liquidity improves not only in emerging markets but that 
developed markets can also benefit from foreign institutional capital flow. 
2.2 DATA DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
2.2.1 Sample Construction 
Foreign institutional holdings are extracted from the FactSet / Lionshares 
database.  The FactSet / Lionshares database compiles global institutional ownership data 
from national regulatory agencies, stock exchange announcements, local and offshore 
mutual funds, mutual fund industry directories and company proxies and annual reports.  
To date, the Lionshares database is the most comprehensive source of international 
institutional ownership (Ferreira and Matos (2008)). For example, Lionshares gathers 
holdings information for U.S. institutions from the SEC 13F filings which require all 
institutions with more than $100 million in equity holdings to report their holdings each 
quarter. 
From the Lionshares database, I extract institutional share holdings (HOLDING) 
of ordinary equity at the end of each December from 2000 through 2009. If the 
institutional investor does not report in December, I follow prior literature and use the 
latest reported share holdings during that calendar year. I restrict the sample to those 
countries that have continuous reporting of stock returns and have a sizable amount of 
foreign institutional ownership (more than half a billion US$). While the database 
provides ample coverage of foreign institutions, it provides weaker coverage of domestic 
institutions especially in emerging countries. This is due to the fact that developed 
nations have more diligent reporting requirements for financial institutions and are the 
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primary source of foreign equity investment. For example, 60% of foreign ownership 
originates from the United States which has high data quality and strict reporting 
standards monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Emerging countries 
typically have less diligent reporting requirements for their financial institutions. For the 
purposes of this study, I primarily focus on foreign institutions but I also examine a 
subset of countries with sufficient domestic institutional coverage. 
The sample consists of all common equity from Datastream from 1999 through 
2009 which includes stocks both on the Datastream dead and active lists.  For all 
common equity, I extract available daily volume (VO), shares outstanding (NOSH), 
market value (MV), and return index (RI) data items. Since this study focuses on local 
stock liquidity, I omit cross listings, American depository receipts (ADRs) and Global 
depository receipts (GDRs) but keep the underlying security in the home country. The 
data are then filtered for outliers, data errors and misclassification following the 
methodology of Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010).14 An additional filter discards 
reported volume (VO) if volume is negative or the daily shares traded are greater than the 
daily shares outstanding (NOSH). Daily closing spot (WM/Reuters) exchange rates are 
obtained from Datastream for currency conversion purposes. 
Annual firm level accounting and other financial data is collect from the 
Worldscope database including book value (WC03501), inside ownership (WC08051) 
and dividend yield (WC09404).  To be included in the sample, a stock must have 
reported book value from the previous calendar year.  Analyst coverage is obtained from 
the I/B/E/S database. 
                                               
14 The database has been kindly provided by the authors.  The filtering process eliminates non-common 
equity such as mutual funds, investment trusts, and unit trusts.  A comprehensive country specific filtering 
process removes additional securities such as preferred stocks, convertibles, and strips.  Extreme and 
erroneous daily returns are set to missing.  Refer to the appendix in Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2010) for 
full details. 
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The final sample is a 10 year panel (2000-2009) with 111,208 firm-years and 
27,918 total firms across 34 countries. Countries are categorized into geographical 
(Americas, Asia and Europe) and economic groupings based on the most recent Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) classifications.15 The sample includes a total of 34 
countries with 21 developed markets (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and 13 emerging 
markets (Chile, China, Hungary, India, Italy, Lithuania,  Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, 
Poland, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). 
2.2.2 Variable Definitions 
The existing research on institutional investors in the United States provides 
useful guidelines for the construction of ownership variables in this study (Gompers and 
Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003)).  First, institutions are categorized as 
foreign if the institution is located in a country different from the country where the 
security is listed. Conversely, institutions are defined as domestic institutions if the 
security is listed in the same country as the institution.  Next, foreign (domestic) 
institutional ownership is measured as the total number of shares held divided by the 
number of shares outstanding by foreign (domestic) institutional investors reported in 
December at the end of the year (FI_OWN, DI_OWN). Third, institutional participation is 
measured as the total number of unique foreign (domestic) institutions holding a security 
in December at the end of the year (FI_NUM, DI_NUM).  
                                               
15 Country classifications are reported in the MSCI Global Investible Market Indices Methodology Book 
(May 2010).  I use the MSCI classification since the MSCI international indices are the most widely used 
indices amongst institutional investors. 
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Table 2.1 presents a complete summary of the variable definitions and original 
data source. Market capitalization (Mktcap) is equal to the market value (Datastream item 
MV) converted to US dollars (US$) on the last trading day of the year.  The stock return 
(Ret) is the total return of the stock including dividend payments over the course of the 
year.  Stock volatility (Vol) is defined as logarithm of the standard deviation of daily 
stock return during the year.  Stock turnover (Turn) is calculated as the summation of the 
daily shares traded, VO, divided by the daily total shares outstanding, NOSH, for each 








t=1 .   
The market-to-book ratio (MTBV) is defined as the ratio of market capitalization 
to book equity at the end of the year.  The number of stock analysts (Analyst) is the total 
number of analysts covering the stock in the IBES database during the year. 
2.2.3 Liquidity Measures 
Liquidity is a complex notion that is difficult to capture with a single empirical 
proxy.  In this study, the primary measure of liquidity is the ILLIQ price impact measure 
developed in Amihud (2002).  The ILLIQ measure is constructed by averaging a daily 
measure of price impact over the course of the year.  For each day a stock trades, a daily 
ILLIQ measure is calculated by dividing the absolute change in the daily stock price by 











where d is the number of trading days in a year, |Rti | is the daily return, Pt
i is the 
adjusted closing price and VO	
 is the trading volume of stock i on trading day d.  By 
measuring ILLIQ over the course of the year, the impact of outliers and data errors are 
minimized.  A 'deep' market, where large trading volumes do not move prices, has lower 
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ILLIQ values while shallow, less-liquid market have higher ILLIQ values.  Following 
standard literature, I trim the 1% extremes of the sample to eliminate outliers and 
calculate the natural logarithm of the ILLIQ measure.  For the regression analysis, I 
calculate the natural log of the ILLIQ measure so that it is convenient to interpret the 
coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables in percentage terms. 
Since the ILLIQ measure is calculated using local prices, it is not easily 
comparable across countries due to currency denomination. For a comparable cross-








t1 , that 
converts trading volume from local currency to US dollars at the daily WM/Reuters 
closing spot rate following Chan, Hong and Subrahmanyam (2008).  
The ILLIQ measure is an attractive measure of liquidity as it can be interpreted as 
the empirical analog of the Kyle lambda parameter.  This makes analysis straightforward 
when interpreting empirical results in relation to theoretical predictions.  Furthermore, the 
ILLIQ measure has been shown to effectively capture price impact over monthly and 
annual time horizons (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009)).  A key drawback of the 
ILLIQ measure is the requirement of volume data which suffers from inconsistent 
coverage in international markets, particularly in emerging countries.   
To resolve this difficulty, I supplement the analysis with additional liquidity 
measures that require only a time-series of daily price data.  Daily price data tends to be 
more accurate and reliably reported in the Datastream database.  Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trzinkca (1999) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) estimate liquidity measures 
based on the incidence of observed zero daily returns (Zeros).  Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2007) emphasize that this measure is especially practical in emerging 
countries due to the relatively poor quality of transactions data.  These return-based 
estimates rely on the idea that the value of the information signal must exceed transaction 
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costs for market participants to execute a trade.16  Hence, these measures are better geared 
at measuring transaction cost component of liquidity, although the correlations with the 
ILLIQ in this sample are still fairly high (0.68 for Zeros).  
The Zeros measure proposed in Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) is the ratio 
of the number of days with a zero return divided by the total number of stock trading 
days 
∑ # of 0 return days
∑ # of total trading days
  during the calendar year.  A similar measure proposed in 
Lesmond, Ogden, Trzinkca (1999), known as the LOT trading cost measure is calculated 
using maximum likelihood estimation described in Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010).  
The results are similar using the LOT measure in place of the Zeroes measure and are 
available from the author. 
2.2.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of stock characteristics for each country.  Panel A 
presents emerging countries and panel B presents developed countries.  The values 
represent the annual means (equal weighted) of each variable from 2000-2009.  In the 
average statistics, the emerging markets in this sample have higher liquidity than the 
developed markets which appears counter-intuitive.  But further examination reveals that 
this is primarily driven by the China and Taiwan markets which are among the most 
liquid markets in the world.  Figure 2.1 presents a time-series plot of ILLIQ throughout 
the decade sorted for different region-development markets.  It displays a general 
improvement in liquidity throughout the decade until the 2008-2009 financial crisis when 
liquidity spiked. 
                                               
16 These two measures are quite similar and differ mainly in their estimation procedure.  Lesmond et al 
(1999) uses maximum likelihood estimation while Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) use a proportion 
of zero trading days. 
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Compared to emerging markets, developed markets have higher average foreign 
institutional ownership (2.33% vs.1.34%) and participation (10.1 vs. 4.4 institutions).  
Figure 2.2 plots a time-series of foreign institutional ownership by region-development.  
It shows a general trend of increasing foreign institutional ownership across all region-
development markets during the past decade.  In particular, there is very strong growth in 
foreign institutional ownership in European developed markets that is potentially due to 
introduction of the Euro currency facilitating integration of capital markets. 
2.3 FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK LIQUIDITY 
This section presents the main empirical findings of whether foreign institutional 
ownership and participation in year t predicts stock liquidity in year t+1. The empirical 
tests are designed in four parts. First, I estimate pooled OLS panel regressions using firms 
in all 34 countries to identify the statistical and economic importance of foreign 
institutional share ownership (%) and participation (number of institutions) on stock 
liquidity.  Second, I show that the results are similar using a first difference regression 
model that estimates changes in liquidity from year t to t+1 on the changes in foreign 
institutional share ownership and participation from year t to t+1.  Next, I validate that 
the results are consistent across emerging and developed markets, geographic sub-
samples, ADR and non-ADR subsamples and for individual countries.  Finally, I examine 
the dynamics of the impact of foreign institutional investors on liquidity over the past 
decade. It is increasingly important to understand the evolving role of foreign institutions 
as they become bigger players in international financial markets. 
2.3.1 Panel Regression Analysis 
The primary econometric framework is a pooled OLS panel regression model.  
The flexibility of panel framework allows for the inclusion of various fixed effects which 
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capture unobserved underlying factors that may impact liquidity. These unobservable 
factors could exist across various dimensions including time, country and firm. This is an 
important consideration given the international nature of this study and the structural 
differences across markets. 
The baseline regression model includes two fixed effects:  country-year fixed 
effect and firm fixed effect. The country-year fixed effect (γ
k,t
) captures unobservable 
country related factors that affect all firms in a country during a given year.  Given that 
there are episodic periods of large capital flows into a country, it is important to control 
for an overall level effect of foreign institutional ownership in a country during a 
particular year (i.e. Argentina 2001).  The remaining within country variation allows for 
the identification of a cross-sectional relationship between foreign institutional ownership 
and liquidity. The firm fixed effect (φi) allows for identification from time-series 
variation.  It parametrically models the average level of foreign institutional ownership 
and liquidity for each stock.  A first difference estimator would provide similar 
identification and is estimated in the following section.  An added benefit of including 
firm fixed effects is that it controls unobservable firm-specific factors that may drive both 
foreign institutional ownership and liquidity. 
 The dependent variable, Illiquidityt+1, is measured in year t+1 while the 
explanatory variables are measured in year t. This framework empirically tests whether a 
firm that experiences higher levels of foreign institutional ownership subsequently 


























Illiquidityi,t+1 for firm i, at time t+1 is measured as either the ILLIQ price impact 
measure following Amihud (2002) or the Zeros trading cost measure.  Both illiquidity 
measures are logarithmically transformed so that the coefficient estimates of the 
independent variables can be interpreted as a one unit change in Xt generates a β percent 
change in Illiquidityt+1. The key explanatory variable FI_Own is measured as the total 
percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors for stock i, at the December 
end of year t. There are a total of 7 additional firm level control variables, Zj,i,t,. The list 
includes market capitalization (Mktcap), the square of market capitalization (Mktcap2), 
stock return (Ret), stock volatility (Vol), market-to-book ratio (MTBV) and the number of 
stock analysts (Analysts).  
To assess statistical significance, standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
following the methodology in Petersen (2009). Since country-year fixed effects 
parametrically models the correlation across stocks in a country during a given year, the 
remaining correlation structure is likely to be at the firm level through time.  This 
clustering technique addresses the possibility that firm observations are likely correlated. 
Table 2.3, column [1] reports the results from the baseline regression model in 
Equation 1.  The estimated coefficient β
1
 of FI_Own is negative (-0.031) and statistically 
significant.  This finding implies that foreign institutional ownership at t predicts future 
increased liquidity at time t+1. The estimated coefficients are economically significant. 
Since the dependant variable ILLIQ is logarithmically transformed, the coefficient 
estimate can be interpreted that on average every percentage increase in share ownership 
by foreign institutional investors predicts a future decrease in ILLIQ of 3.1%. 
The number of foreign institutional investors may affect stock liquidity. I estimate 
an additional regression specification presented in Equation (2) that includes the number 
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Table 2.3, column [2] reports the results from regression Equation (2). The 
coefficient estimate β
2
  of FI_Num is negative (-0.008) and statistically significant which 
indicates that number of foreign institutional investors is associated with higher future 
liquidity.  The coefficient estimate β1  (-0.018) of FI_Own remains negative and 
statistically significant. This suggests that both the share ownership and number of 
foreign institutional investors are associated with future increases in liquidity.  
The results are robust to using the Zeros measure of liquidity.  As discussed in the 
previous section, liquidity is particularly difficult to measure in an international setting 
given the issues with volume data. The results in column [3] in Table 2.3 demonstrate 
that the coefficient estimate β
1
  (-0.008) of FI_Own and β
2
  (-0.001) of FI_Num remain 
negative and statistically significant using the Zeros measure as the dependant variable. 
The economic magnitudes using the Zeros measure are smaller compared to the ILLIQ 
measure.  The results indicate that on average a percentage increase in share ownership 
by foreign institutional investors predicts a future decrease in Zeros of 0.8% compared to 
a future decrease in ILLIQ of 1.8% in specification [2]. 
A potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that foreign 
institutional ownership is just a proxy for domestic institutional ownership.  In which 
case, the results would be capturing the liquidity effect driven by domestic institutional 
investors and not foreign institutional investors. I address this issue by estimating a 
specification that includes domestic institutional ownership in a subsample of countries 
where there is sizable amount of reporting of domestic institutional ownership (UK, 
Sweden, Poland, Norway, Germany, France, Finland and Denmark). To demonstrate the 
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incremental impact of foreign institutional ownership on liquidity, I first estimate a 
specification with only domestic institutional ownership, DI_Own, and then introduce 
foreign institutional ownership, FI_Own, back into the specification. 
Specification [4] of Table 2.3 shows that the coefficient estimate of DI_Own is 
negative (-0.014) and statistically significant which indicates that domestic institutional 
ownership predicts higher liquidity. This result is consistent with US studies that find that 
institutional ownership is associated with higher future liquidity (Liu (2008), Agarwal 
(2009)). Column [5] of Table 2.3 includes foreign institutional ownership in the 
regression specification. The coefficient estimates on DI_Own (-0.012) and FI_Own (-
0.020) are negative and statistically significant.  Column [6] finds similar results using 
the full sample.  These findings are consistent with the notion that foreign institutional 
ownership increases liquidity beyond the effect of domestic institutional ownership. 
2.3.2 First Difference (Changes) Regressions 
The firm fixed effects specification in the prior section estimates how variables 
change relative to their average level within a firm. The results indicate that relatively 
higher levels of foreign institutional ownership or participation predict higher future 
levels of liquidity.  Alternatively, identifying the relationship between foreign institutions 
and liquidity can also be estimated by testing whether a recent change in foreign 
institutional ownership is related to a subsequent change in liquidity. To do this, I 
estimate a first difference regression model to ensure that the empirical findings with the 
firm fixed effects regression model are robust.  I regress future changes in illiquidity 
(t+1) on changes in foreign institutional ownership and firm level characteristics (t). 
Since the first difference captures innovations in the variables, I omit firm fixed effects as 
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it would cloud the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. The regression model 






























∆Illiquidityi,t+1 for firm i, at time t+1 is measured as Illiquidityi,t+1 – Illiquidityi,t where 
Illiquidity is either the logarithm of the ILLIQ price impact measure or the logarithm of 
the Zeros trading cost measure, ∆FI_Own (∆FI_Num) is the change in FI_Own 
(FI_Num) defined as FI_Owni,t – FI_Owni,t-1, (FI_Numi,t – FI_Numi,t-1), and ∆Zj,i,t is the 
change in the additional seven firm level control variables (Mktcap, Mktcap2, Ret, Turn, 
Vol, MTBV, and Analysts) and γk,t is country-year fixed effect. 
Table 2.4 reports the estimated coefficients and t-statistics from the first 
difference estimator. The regression estimates present similar inferences as the fixed 
effect panel regression estimates in the previous section. The coefficient estimates on ∆ 
FI_Own and ∆ FI_Num are negative and statistically significant across the six regression 
specifications as detailed in the prior section. The results find that both changes in foreign 
institutional ownership, ∆ FI_Own, and changes in the number of foreign institutional 
investors, ∆ FI_Num, predict future changes in liquidity. These findings provide a 
complementary robustness check to the main results with an alternative econometric 
framework.  They also offer a slightly different economic interpretation. Specifically, the 
results imply that in the cross-section, stocks that experience larger increases in the 
number and share ownership of foreign institutional investors relative to other stocks in 
the current year subsequently experience greater improvements in liquidity in the next 
year. 
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2.3.3 Subsample Analysis 
The pooled analysis of 34 countries identifies a general result that foreign 
institutional ownership predicts future stock liquidity. While this documents an important 
general worldwide effect, it is possible that these results may be isolated to particular 
countries, geographic regions or amongst certain types of stocks. For example, there is 
the potential concern that the results may be isolated to stocks that have cross-listings 
through ADRs or GDRs. Cross-listed stocks tend to exhibit different characteristics than 
non cross-listed stocks and may have intrinsic differences that drive the prior findings. 
I perform two additional tests to corroborate the evidence that foreign institutional 
investors improve liquidity. First, I estimate the baseline specification of Equation (1) 
across sub-samples classified by developed and emerging markets, ADR and non-ADR 
samples and three geographical regions (Asia, America, and Europe). The results of the 
subsample analysis are presented in Table 2.5. The coefficient estimates β
1
 of FI_Own 
are consistently negative and statistically significant across developed and emerging 
markets, geographical regions and for ADR and non-ADR stocks. 
Second, I repeat this analysis for each individual country. In this model, country-
year fixed effects are replaced with year effects since the regressions are estimated 
separately for each country. The coefficient estimates β
1
 of FI_Own are negative for 31 
of the 34 countries and statistically significant at the 5% level for 20 of those countries. 
To conserve space and for ease of presentation, the coefficient estimates (β
1
) for FI_Own 
for each country are plotted in Figure 2.3. 
2.3.4 Time Variation in the Impact of Foreign Institutional Investors on Liquidity 
How has the importance of foreign institutional investors on liquidity changed 
over time? In particular, how important was this relationship during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis when market liquidity quickly evaporated across financial markets? 
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Illiquidity was a defining characteristic of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.  During market 
downturns, financial assets tend to become illiquid.  Hameed, Kang and Viswananthan 
(2010) document that liquidity dries up in NYSE stocks during negative market returns.  
Brennan, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong (2010) find similar evidence that sell-side 
illiquidity exceeds buy-side illiquidity. Anand, Puckett, Irvine and Venkataraman (2011) 
find that institutions experienced increased trading costs during the crisis. Both studies 
document that this asymmetric effects is related to the funding market. Figure 2.1 shows 
that illiquidity spiked across all geographical regions in 2008 to the liquidity levels of the 
early 2000’s. 
To address this question, I estimate ten annual (2000-2009) cross sectional 
regressions of the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and liquidity.  The 
regression model is similar to the baseline regression presented in Equation 1 but omits 
firm fixed effects as there is only a single time period for each regression.   
The regression model is presented below in Equation (4) and uses the same 






















γ  (4) 
The results are plotted in Figure 2.4. The annual coefficient estimates on FI_Own 
exhibit a general downwards trend through the decade. During the later periods from 
2007 to 2009, the coefficient estimates on FI_Own are more negative than any point 
during the decade.  These results indicate the growing importance of the impact of 
foreign institutional investors on liquidity.   
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2.4 ENDOGENEITY 
A central concern of this analysis is that the relationship between foreign 
institutional ownership and stock liquidity is endogenous. From a statistical perspective, 
the increasing trend in foreign institutional ownership and stock liquidity could generate a 
spurious relationship. From an economics perspective, financial institutions may self-
select into liquid stocks because the redemption demands of their clients may force them 
to liquidate positions quickly exposing them to potentially costly price impact. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that institutions conscientiously assess the costs of trading and the 
price impact of their trades. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that institutions exhibit a 
preference for certain stock characteristics including stocks with high turnover.  
To examine these alternative explanations, I propose three additional causality 
tests. First, I test whether recent improvements in stock liquidity predict subsequent 
foreign institutional ownership (t+1). The results (unreported) suggest that while 
institutions are attracted to stocks with higher levels of liquidity, recent changes in 
liquidity are not significant. This suggests that foreign institutions are not buying stocks 
for their recent liquidity improvements. For the second test, I propose that a potential 
omitted variable that is associated with both increases in foreign institutional ownership 
and liquidity improvement is future stock returns. Foreign institutions may possess 
information so their stock holdings exhibit higher future returns. Higher stock returns 
may attract the attention of additional uninformed investors which could increase 
liquidity trading (Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004)). To test this alternative 
explanation, I estimate previous regression specifications on a sub-sample split on stocks 
with positive and negative future stock returns.  In unreported results, foreign institutional 
ownership predicts future liquidity for both stocks that experience higher or lower future 
stock returns. 
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2.4.1 2003 Dividend Tax Change 
In the final test, I exploit the 2003 United States Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) to create a natural experiment.  The 2003 JGTRRA tax cut 
includes a provision to lower dividend tax rates to a maximum of 15% starting in 2003.17 
The tax cut was also extended to dividends from ‘qualified’ foreign corporations 
domiciled in a subset of countries that have tax treaties with the United States.  US 
investors can receive the entire benefit of this tax cut since foreign dividend tax 
withholdings are typically lower than 15%.18 The un-qualified dividends from 
corporations from non-treaty countries remains taxed at the ordinary personal income tax 
rate (35% for the top income tax bracket after JGTRRA).   
The 2003 US dividend tax cut provides a natural experiment because qualified 
stocks become relatively more attractive to US investors after the tax change. This 
generates an exogenous shock to foreign institutional ownership by US investors for 
qualified, dividend-paying foreign stocks but not for similar stocks located in non-treaty 
countries. The impact of portfolio reallocation by US investors can be economically 
significant given that US institutions comprise 60% of foreign capital in this sample.  The 
JGTRRA tax cut is a viable instrument for this study under the condition that qualified 
dividend paying stocks exhibit a subsequent increase in US institutional ownership and 
that the tax change itself did not increase liquidity in these stocks. Given that US tax law 
changes are unlikely to change the liquidity of foreign stocks (independent from 
increasing foreign institutional ownership), it can be assumed that the later condition is 
satisfied. 
                                               
17 More precisely, after JGTRRA, dividends would be taxed at the same rate as capital gains which would 
be taxed at a maximum of 15%. 
18 The US tax code allows for a direct tax credit for foreign withholdings of dividends.    
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Desai and Dharmapala (2010) perform an extensive analysis of the effects of the 
JGTRRA tax-cut on aggregate U.S. foreign portfolio investment and conclude that the 
treaty status was chosen for its relative simplicity and administrative feasibility.  A 
potential concern with this experimental design might be that non-treaty countries are 
considerably different than tax-treaty countries, in which case non-tax treaty countries 
would make a poor control group.   The non-treaty countries19 include Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan which are both active trading partners with the United States and a 
significant destination for US equity capital.   
To assess the validity of this instrument, I first test whether US tax sensitive 
institutions increased their holdings towards qualified dividend paying stock after the 
enactment of JGTRAA.  If US institutional reallocation was minimal, the tax-cut would 
serve as a poor instrument.  Sialm and Starks (2010) find that mutual funds primarily held 
by taxable investors tend to be more tax-efficient. This suggests that it would be likely 
that US mutual fund managers would be aware of the tax implications of JGTRAA.  
I use a difference-in-difference framework to test the impact of the tax cut on US 
institutional holdings in qualified dividend stocks. Since the portfolio reallocation effects 
would only happen around the time of the tax law change, I only include the years 2002, 
2003 and 2004. The dependant variable is the % share ownership of US mutual funds (% 
US Tax) which excludes other tax exempt institutions such as pension funds. The 
































                                               
19 The entire list of non-treaty countries is:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. 
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This difference-in-difference panel regression framework includes three 
additional dummy variables.  A dummy variable is equal to 1 if the stock is located in a 
treaty country and pays a dividend (Qualified).  A separate dummy is equal to 1 if the 
observation is after 2002 and zero otherwise (Post 2002).  Finally, the Treatment dummy 
is the interaction between Qualified * Post-Tax Cut dummies and represents the group of 
firms that US investors are expected to reallocate their portfolio towards.   I include firm 
level control variables (,,) from the previous regressions.  The regressions include 
country-fixed effects () and the standard errors are clustered at that country-year level. 
Table 2.6 reports the results of this regression. Column [1] reports the three 
difference-in-difference dummy variables. First, the coefficient estimate β1 on the 
Qualified dummy is not significant suggesting that unconditionally qualified dividend 
paying foreign corporations do not have higher US mutual fund ownership. Second, the 
coefficient estimate β2 on the Post 2002 is positive (0.025) and statistically significant 
suggesting that after 2002, US tax sensitive institutions increased their holdings amongst 
all international stocks. Third, the main coefficient estimate of interest, β3 is positive 
(0.029) and statistically significant suggesting that US institutions reallocated towards 
qualified dividend corporations after the 2003 dividend tax cut which is consistent with 
the evidence presented in Desai and Dharmapala (2010).  This suggests that the JGTRAA 
is a viable instrument for foreign institutional ownership.  As an alternative test, column 
[2] reports the results of the same regression, but replaces the dependant variable with 
share ownership by US pension funds. Since pension funds are unaffected by tax 
changes, their allocation decisions will not change due to the tax change. The coefficient 
estimates for β1, β2, β3 are insignificant which confirms that US mutual funds likely 
reallocated towards dividend-paying stocks in tax-treaty countries due to the preferred tax 
treatment initiated from JGTRAA.  Together these results confirm the evidence in Desai 
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and Dharmapala (2010) that the 2003 dividend tax cut created a positive shock in US 
institutional ownership in qualified dividend paying stocks. 
Next, I test whether these qualified dividend paying stocks experience a 
subsequent improvement in liquidity. I estimate a difference-in-difference panel 
regression following Equation (5) but I replaced %US Tax with measures of liquidity 
where liquidity is either the logarithm of the ILLIQ price impact measure or the Zeros 
trading cost measure.  The results are reported in columns [4] and [5]. The findings 
indicate that the main coefficient estimate of interest, β3 is negative and statistically 
significant for both measures of liquidity.  The interpretation of this result is that liquidity 
improved more for qualified dividend corporations after the 2003 dividend tax cut. Taken 
together, these results are consistent with foreign institutions improving liquidity rather 
than self-selecting into liquid stocks. 
2.5 INFORMATION COMPETITION AND LIQUIDITY 
The information competition channel hypothesis proposes that liquidity may 
improve though the competition effects of informed traders. Subrahmanyam (1991) and 
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) solve an equilibrium where additional informed traders 
compete away the profits of withholding information which lowers information 
asymmetry and improves liquidity.  A convincing argument for this liquidity channel 
would require isolating situations where foreign institutional investors are plausibly 
informed. Since it is notoriously difficult to observe information, I rely on existing 
evidence that documents circumstances where certain types of institutional investors 
demonstrate informational advantages. 
I design four empirical tests that isolate plausible sources of informed trading. 
First, I separate foreign institutional investors into groups based on investor 
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sophistication. It is likely that more sophisticated institutions are more skilled traders and 
are more likely to possess valuable information. Although it is difficult to directly 
observe sophistication, previous studies find that the patterns of equity capital flows 
originating from the United States are consistent with US investors being informed (Froot 
and Ramadorai (2008), Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2009)). To proxy for 
sophistication, I determine whether the institution originates from an emerging or 
developed market. While this is an admittedly simple method of categorizing institutions, 
I hypothesize that institutions originating from developed markets are likely to be more 
sophisticated.  
Second, I use geographical proximity as a proxy for informed trading.  Numerous 
studies document that investors located in geographical proximity to information sources 
possess informational advantages (Hau (2001), Shive (2011)). Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001) and Baik, Kang and Kim (2010)), and find that institutional investors enjoy excess 
returns on their holdings of locally headquartered firms.  Individual investors may also 
earn excess returns on their local holdings (Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). 
In the third test, foreign institutional investors are separated into five groups based 
on investor class. While prior studies document that mutual funds and investment 
advisors may possess valuable information, those results might not be readily generalized 
to this setting given the foreign nature of this study. Instead, I hypothesize that in 
international markets, the most natural institutional group to possess valuable information 
is likely to be banks. Given the growing international nature of the banking business, 
banks may have access to privileged global information that is relevant for trading in 
many foreign countries as suggested in Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2009). For 
example, McBrady, Mortal and Schill (2010) find that firms issue international bonds at 
opportunistic currency denominations, presumably under the advice of their bankers. 
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Dvorak (2005) finds global brokerage houses exhibit excess returns trading in Indonesian 
equities.20 
If the improvement in liquidity from foreign institutional investors arises from 
information competition between foreign institutions and other shareholders, this effect 
should be more prominent for stocks located in countries with more opaque information 
environments. For the fourth test, I test the information competition effect of foreign 
institutional investors by across different information environments at the country level. 
a. Sophisticated capital  
To test whether sophisticated capital is the source of liquidity, I estimate the 
baseline panel regressions from equation (1) but separate foreign institutional ownership 
(FI_Own) into three groups based on the origin of capital: US-based (FIO_US), Non-US 
developed market based (FIO_DevNonUS), or emerging market based (FIO_Emg). US 
institutions are split into a separate group from the rest of the developed markets because 
they are the largest source of international capital. Table 2.7A presents results from these 
regressions.  Column [1] presents the full sample results.  The coefficient estimates on 
FIO_US and FIO_DevNonUS are negative (-0.026, -0.035) and statistically significant 
while the coefficient estimate on FIO_Emg is not statistically significant.  This suggests 
that foreign institutions located in developed markets are primarily responsible for 
improving liquidity.  Columns [2]-[4] report geographic subsamples and show similar 
effects across geographical regions. The coefficient estimates on both FIO_US and 
FIO_DevNonUS are negative and statistically significant across all geographical regions 
suggesting that capital from developed markets improve liquidity.   
                                               
20 These brokerage houses are international banks which include ABN Amro, Credit Lyonnais, HSBC, 
ING Baring, J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and UBS Warburg. 
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These results provide support for the hypothesis that the liquidity improvement is 
generated by sophisticated capital which is consistent with the information competition 
hypothesis. It should be noted that the Lionshares database has limited coverage of 
institutions located in emerging countries as local regulation has lower reporting 
requirements. An alternative interpretation of these results is that FIO_Emg is measured 
with considerable noise which makes it difficult to draw strong inferences from this 
analysis alone.  Hence, I create additional tests in the following sub-sections to bolster the 
interpretation of the information competition hypothesis. 
b. Geographic proximity 
Since geographic proximity may proxy for information advantages, I separate 
institutions into groups depending on whether the institution is located within or outside 
three geographical regions (America, Asia, and Europe). Again, US institutions are 
separated into their own category since they are a larger group. Table 2.7B presents 
results from regressions of liquidity on foreign institutional ownership separated into 
geographical proximity based on the baseline panel specification in Equation (1).  
Across all three subsamples in columns [5]–[7], FIO_US is negative and 
statistically significant suggesting that even across large distances US institutions have a 
positive effect on liquidity.  The European subsample results are presented in column [5] 
and are the most consistent with the information competition hypothesis. The coefficient 
estimate on FIO_Europe is negative (-0.039) and statistically significant while the 
coefficient estimate on FIO_NonEuro is not statistically significant. This suggests that the 
liquidity improvement occurs primarily from institutional located within the European 
region.  It is plausible that information effects are larger given the interconnected of 
European economies and the sharing of monetary policy through the Euro currency. 
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The results from the Asia and America subsample provide mixed evidence.  In the 
Asia subsample presented in Column [6] of Table 2.7B, the coefficient estimate on 
FIO_Asia is negative and statistically significant but the coefficient estimate on 
FIO_NonAsia is also negative and statistically significant.  This suggests that liquidity is 
improving from both regional and non-regional sources.  Column [7] of Table 2.7B 
presents the results from the America subsample.  The evidence here is inconsistent with 
the information competition hypothesis.  Although both coefficient estimates on 
FIO_Amer and FIO_NonAmerica are both negative (-0.026, -0.028), only the coefficient 
estimate on FIO_NonAmerica is statistically significant.  This suggests that the liquidity 
improvement for markets located in America originate from non-American institutions. A 
possible explanation is that there are large economic differences and greater geographical 
distances between North and South America and so geographic proximity is a poor proxy 
for information. 
c. Institutional types 
A key benefit of the Lionshares database is that it provides comprehensive details 
on the institutions it covers. I separate foreign institutional investors into five broad 
groups:  1. Banks. 2. Hedge funds which include arbitrage funds, brokers, market makers, 
stock borrowing institutions, and hedge funds, 3. Insurance and Pensions funds which 
include insurance companies, pensions, and endowment funds. 4. Mutual funds and 
5.Investment advisors. 
The results in Table 2.8 reveal that liquidity channel are primarily from banks and 
investment advisors.  In both developed and emerging markets, the coefficient estimate 
on the bank class of institutions is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent 
with the evidence in Dvorak (2005) that international brokerage firms possess 
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informational advantages in international markets. It also supports the information 
competition hypothesis that informed trading may improve liquidity.21 Since banks have 
ADR shares, it is possible that strong effect of foreign bank ownership on liquidity is 
driven by their holdings of ADR shares.  To address this concern, I estimate additional 
regressions on sub-samples of stocks with ADR and without ADRs in columns [4] and 
[5].  The coefficient estimates on FIO_Bank remain negative and statistically significant 
in both subsamples which suggest that the impact of foreign banks on liquidity is not 
driven by ADRs. 
d. Information opacity 
If the liquidity effect of foreign institutional ownership arises from information 
competition with other informed traders, it is likely to be more important for firms 
located in markets with opaque information environments. Markets with high information 
asymmetry are likely to have more informed trading including potential insider trading.  
I use several country-level financial and accounting information measures to 
proxy for the information environment in each country. These information measures 
include: 1. Accounting standards from the Global Competitiveness Report published by 
the World Economic Forum, 2. Anti-self dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)), 3. Prevalence of insider trading and 4. Financial disclosure 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002)). Insider trading is measured 
using the prevalence of insider trading measure reported from executive surveys collected 
by the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Report).  Griffin, Kelly and 
Hirschey (2010) find that the prevalence of insider trading can partially explain the 
                                               
21 According to Del Guercio (1996) banks invest in higher quality securities which may continue to receive 
more attention.  This suggests that foreign institutions may draw attention to a stock from their ownership 
suggesting an alternative attention effect which attracts additional noise traders (Merton (1987)). 
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reaction to news announcements. For easier comparison, I create a dummy variable equal 
to 1 when the market index value lies below the 25th percent of all countries and 0 
otherwise.   
Table 2.9 presents the results of panel regressions that include an interaction term 
for foreign institutional ownership and information environment dummies. The results 
are consistent with the information competition channel. The interaction terms are 
negative and statistically significant for all four measures of information competition 
which suggest that the effect of foreign institutional ownership on liquidity is stronger in 
opaque markets. Although the direction of the effect is as predicted, a word of caution 
needs to be taken in interpreting the statistical significance of these results. Since the 
sample size is large, the marginal significance of these results should be interpreted as 
weak statistical evidence. 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines the relationship between foreign institutional investors and 
stock liquidity across 34 equity markets. The findings indicate that increases in foreign 
institutional investment causally improve liquidity in both developed and emerging 
markets. The findings are also consistent with the informed actions of foreign 
institutional investors improving liquidity. Their trading increases the competition with 
other informed agents over trading profits which lowers informational asymmetries and 
improves liquidity. 
This study also sheds light on our general understanding on the relationship 
between financial institutions and market liquidity. Since liquidity concurrently improved 
with the growth of financial institutions, it has been difficult to identify the direction of 
causality. To solve this challenge, I exploit the 2003 U. S. dividend tax cut as a natural 
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experiment to show that institutions causally improve liquidity. Given that financial 
institutions are a dominant player in financial markets, it is important for both 
policymakers and academics to clearly understand their role in financial markets. 
While this study finds evidence in support of an information competition channel, 
there are likely to be other channels through which foreign institutions improve stock 
liquidity in the domestic market. Foreign institutional investors may improve liquidity 
indirectly. For example, foreign ownership tends to attract the attention of the news 
media and business press. They may also attract the attention of stock analysts who may 
facilitate the dissemination of public information. This could enhance recognition 
amongst uninformed investors who purchase the stock and increase noise trading.  This 
attention effect may lead to higher liquidity (Merton (1987), Grullon, Kanatas, and 
Weston (2004)). Furthermore, theoretically the information competition channel should 
also make prices more informative.22 Although this is beyond the scope of this study, the 




                                               
22 Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find evidence that on the NYSE, stocks with greater institutional ownership 
are priced more efficiently. 
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America - Emerging America - Dev
Asia - Emg Asia - Dev
Description: The figure plots the cross-sectional value-weighted average of 
the log ILLIQ price impact measure (Amihud (2002)) by geographical 
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America - Emg America - Dev
Asia - Emg Asia - Dev
Europe - Emg Europe - Dev
Description: The figure plots the cross-sectional percentage foreign 
institutional ownership by geographical region and market development 
from 2000-2009.
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Description:  This figure presents coefficient estimates of liquidity of foreign 
institutional ownership from the following regresision:
ILLIQfirm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Own firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t
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Description: This figure presents cross-sectional annual coefficient estimates of liquidity
on foreign institutional ownership from the regression model: ILLIQ firm, t+1 = α + β1*
FI_Own firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t where Illiq is the logarithm of
annual ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)), FI_Own is the % share ownership of foreign
institutional investors, Firm characteristics include seven control variables (Mktcap, Mktcap2,
Ret, Turn, Vol, MTBV, and Analysts), γk,t is a country k, year t fixed effect and φfirm is a firm
fixed effect. Complete variable definitions are described in Table 1. The sample period is
from 2000 to 2009. Robust t-statistics are presented in brackets. Standard errors are
clusteredby firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions 
Description:  This table presents the names, definitions and data sources for the variables used in this study. 
     Definition Source 
Institutional Ownership variables 
Foreign Institutions Ownership FI_Own Foreign institutional share ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding. 
Lionshares 
Domestic Institutions Ownership DI_Own Domestic institutional share ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding. 
Lionshares 
Foreign Institutions Number FI_Num Foreign institutional share ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding. 
Lionshares 
Domestic Institutions Number DI_Num Domestic institutional share ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding. 
Lionshares 
Liquidity Variables 
   Illiquidity ILLIQ Log of average daily ratio of the absolute stock return 
divided by the US$ volume traded calculated following 
Amihud (2002) 
Datastream 
Percentage Zeros ZEROS Log of the proportion of zero daily returns during the year. Datastream 
Firm Level Control Variables 
Market Capitalization Mktcap Market capitalization in US dollars at the end of the year Datastream 
Market-to-Book MTBV Log of market-to-book equity ratio (market value is 
Datastream item MV and book value of equity is 
Worldscope item 03501) 
Datastream/Worldscope 
Annual Stock Return Ret Annual stock return  Datastream 
Turnover Turn Annual summation of daily percentage stock turnover Datastream 
Stock Volatility Vol Log of the standard deviation of daily stock return Datastream 
Insider Holdings Inside Number of Closely Held Shares / Common Shares 
Outstanding (Worldscope item 08021) 
Worldscope 
Dividend Yield DY Dividend Yield (Worldscope item 09404) Worldscope 
Number of analysts Analyst Number of Analysts  (IBES item Numest) I/B/E/S International 
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Table 2.2A: Summary Statistics 
Description:  This table presents the time-series cross-sectional mean of firm level variables by country.  # of firms is the number of firms in a country.  Size is 
the market capitalization in US dollars.  Illiq is the Amihud illiquidity measure calculated in local currency.  Illiq$ is the Amihud illiquidity measure scaled using US 
dollars. summary statistics.  Zeros is the percentage of daily zero return days during the year.  FI_Own denotes foreign institutional ownership as a percentage of 
shares outstanding.  DI_Own denotes domestic foreign institutional ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding.  FI_Num is the number of foreign 
institutional investors with a position in the stock.  DI_Num is the number of domestic institutional investors with a position in the stock.  RET is the annual 
stock return.  TURN is the annual turnover.  VOL is the standard deviation of returns.  MTBV is the market-to-book ratio.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares 
held by corporate insiders. The sample is from 2000 to 2009. 
Panel A. Emerging Markets 
Country # Firm Mktcap Illiq Illiq$ Zeros FI_Own DI_Own FI_Num DI_Num Ret Turn MTBV Inside 
Chile 80 1123 -6.65 -0.27 0.48 0.73 0.35 4.7 0.3 1.25 0.15 0.20 60.3 
China 978 507 -6.08 -4.01 0.08 0.11 1.71 0.2 1.1 1.32 2.17 1.22 54.8 
Hungary 22 523 -5.77 -0.37 0.18 6.85 0.67 21.2 1.5 1.11 0.70 0.06 59.1 
India 477 688 -4.04 -0.21 0.05 2.02 2.08 5.9 3.1 1.46 0.42 0.32 52.4 
Italy 185 686 -2.06 -2.21 0.11 3.17 1.72 16.1 4.8 1.02 0.61 0.41 51.4 
Lithuania 13 312 0.21 1.21 0.31 8.22 0.23 6.5 0.4 1.48 0.15 0.12 67.1 
Malaysia 583 249 -0.22 1.09 0.34 0.91 0.33 4.9 0.9 1.06 0.44 -0.02 49.0 
Mexico 35 1568 -2.83 -0.45 0.19 4.54 0.43 22.1 0.9 1.28 0.30 0.13 49.8 
Philippines 74 355 -2.04 1.88 0.52 2.55 0.03 8.7 0.2 1.32 0.29 -0.11 68.1 
Poland 121 484 -1.42 -0.18 0.16 3.20 8.79 13.3 5.5 1.32 0.65 0.32 58.1 
South Korea 722 206 -8.75 -1.72 0.11 2.23 0.11 5.1 0.1 1.21 2.35 -0.38 38.7 
Taiwan 773 218 -5.45 -1.95 0.14 1.24 0.15 4.6 0.3 1.16 1.84 0.16 26.2 
Thailand 231 293 -3.05 0.62 0.30 1.74 0.47 6.0 1.3 1.25 0.76 0.05 54.4 
Emerging 
Average 
  382 -4.91 -1.43 0.16 1.34 1.01 4.4 1.1 1.23 1.40 0.32 46.9 
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Table 2.2B: Summary Statistics Continued 
Panel B.  Developed Markets 
Country 
# 
Firms Size Illiq Illiq$ Zeros FI_Own DI_Own FI_Num DI_Num Ret Turn MTBV Inside 
Australia 816 223 0.82 0.43 0.33 1.70 0.68 5.5 0.8 1.21 0.60 0.60 36.9 
Austria 50 1060 -1.01 -0.86 0.29 6.28 1.36 34.3 5.7 1.19 0.33 0.29 57.2 
Belgium 80 567 -0.61 -0.46 0.26 4.10 2.45 17.6 4.6 1.09 0.22 0.37 53.5 
Canada 962 229 1.12 0.86 0.30 2.52 6.88 3.5 5.3 1.32 0.54 0.51 27.4 
Denmark 141 520 -0.52 -2.37 0.39 2.23 7.16 11.7 3.8 1.17 0.33 0.36 40.1 
Finland 104 457 -0.43 -0.28 0.29 5.88 7.19 17.9 6.3 1.13 0.41 0.57 35.9 
France 528 604 0.48 0.26 0.27 2.90 3.16 12.4 7.8 1.11 0.33 0.52 58.0 
Germany 487 1572 0.78 0.93 0.22 4.23 3.54 27.6 8.4 1.07 0.23 0.36 49.9 
Greece 250 292 -0.37 -0.22 0.16 1.35 0.13 7.6 0.4 0.91 0.57 0.40 56.6 
Hong Kong 551 370 0.21 -1.84 0.35 2.71 0.86 11.1 1.5 1.32 0.68 0.04 56.2 
Ireland 38 1241 -0.75 -0.60 0.18 12.43 0.60 44.9 2.2 1.14 0.41 0.55 29.4 
Japan 3079 375 -1.26 -5.98 0.25 1.48 1.58 10.1 6.1 1.06 0.54 -0.01 43.4 
Netherlands 97 531 -1.10 -0.95 0.24 6.39 4.23 19.6 1.6 1.11 0.68 0.57 44.1 
New Zealand 72 277 0.28 -0.25 0.43 2.09 0.55 9.5 0.6 1.12 0.21 0.48 52.2 
Norway 137 331 -0.34 -2.28 0.37 4.24 6.89 11.9 4.1 1.20 0.83 0.31 41.4 
Portugal 38 813 -0.64 -0.48 0.28 2.18 3.03 24.2 7.3 1.10 0.38 0.40 64.9 
Singapore 355 226 0.90 0.41 0.43 1.74 0.48 6.9 0.9 1.15 0.56 0.12 54.6 
Spain 80 1167 -2.94 -2.79 0.18 3.31 3.11 21.4 20.3 1.13 0.57 0.65 48.7 
Sweden 242 247 -0.13 -2.22 0.26 3.44 8.82 8.6 5.1 1.11 0.63 0.79 37.7 
Switzerland 159 707 -1.46 -1.74 0.28 5.27 5.01 15.8 7.9 1.10 0.32 0.39 45.7 
UK. 1101 247 -0.71 -0.19 0.52 1.93 12.55 5.6 10.8 1.06 0.60 0.52 34.9 
Developed Average   422 -2.07 -0.32 0.31 2.33 3.78 10.1 5.5 1.13 0.53 0.30 43.9 
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Table 2.3: Regression of Liquidity on Foreign Institutional Ownership 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from the annual baseline panel regression specification:  
  Liquidity firm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Own firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t 
where Liquidity is measured as either the logarithm of annual ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)) or the logarithm of 
annual ZEROs measure, FI_Own is the % share ownership of foreign institutional investors, γk,t is a country k, year 
t fixed effect and φfirm is a firm fixed effect.  Specifications [2] - [6] include additional explanatory variables: 
FI_Num denotes the number of foreign institutions and DI_Own denotes the % share ownership of domestic 
institutional investors.  Complete variable definitions are described in Table 1.  The sample period is from 2000 to 
2009.  Robust t-statistics are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  
 
Illiq Illiq Zeros Illiq Illiq Illiq 
 











    
  
[-9.557] [-3.251] 
    DI_Own 
   
-0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** 
 
    
[-7.208] [-6.604] [-12.940] 
 
Mktcap -0.204*** -0.153*** -0.043*** -0.129*** -0.114*** -0.204*** 
 
 
[-8.336] [-7.377] [-6.868] [-4.921] [-4.524] [-8.367] 
 Mktcap2 1.395*** 1.192*** 0.329*** 0.781*** 0.705*** 1.389*** 
 
 
[4.728] [4.432] [4.595] [3.887] [3.733] [4.732] 
 Ret -0.318*** -0.321*** -0.077*** -0.465*** -0.466*** -0.317*** 
 
 
[-21.511] [-21.506] [-20.226] [-29.140] [-29.315] [-21.526] 
 MTBV -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.065*** -0.194*** -0.188*** -0.200*** 
 
 
[-19.915] [-19.627] [-16.761] [-11.418] [-11.127] [-19.687] 
 Turn -0.249*** -0.245*** -0.029*** -0.267*** -0.265*** -0.249*** 
 
 
[-34.312] [-34.016] [-11.824] [-10.087] [-10.054] [-34.429] 
 Vol 0.397*** 0.408*** -0.019** 0.432*** 0.433*** 0.385*** 
 
 
[20.530] [21.088] [-2.254] [13.425] [13.528] [20.022] 
 Analyst -0.082*** -0.078*** -0.023*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.080*** 
 
 
[-23.507] [-22.452] [-14.992] [-14.580] [-14.063] [-23.033] 
 
        
Observations 127511 127511 127511 26730 26730 127511 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.883 0.941 0.819 0.875 0.875 0.940   
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Table 2.4: Regression of Change in Liquidity on Change in Foreign Institutional 
Ownership 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from the annual baseline panel regression specification:  
  ∆Liquidity firm, t+1 = α + β1* ∆FI_Own firm, t + Σjβj*∆Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t + ε firm, t 
where ∆Liquidity is measured as the annual change in the logarithm of the ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)) or 
the logarithm of the ZEROs measure.  γk,t denotes a county k, year t fixed effect.  Specifications [2] - [6] 
include additional explanatory variables ∆FI_Num which is the number of foreign institutions and ∆DI_Own 
which is the % share ownership of domestic institutional investors. Complete variable definitions are presented 
in Table 1.  The sample period is from 2000 to 2009.  T-statistics are presented in brackets.  Standard errors 
are robust and clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 
 
Illiq Illiq Zeros Illiq Illiq Illiq 
 





[-8.187] [-2.914] [-1.995] 
 
[-4.262] [-7.623] 
 ∆ FI_Num 
 
-0.006*** -0.001*** 
    
  
[-12.993] [-5.147] 
    ∆ DI_Own 
   
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 
    
[-3.024] [-2.747] [-6.783] 
 
Mktcap -0.078*** -0.067*** -0.006* -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.079*** 
 
 
[-6.680] [-6.132] [-1.647] [-3.680] [-3.377] [-6.697] 
 Mktcap2 0.493*** 0.444*** 0.083*** 0.216*** 0.201*** 0.494*** 
 
 
[4.745] [4.546] [3.132] [3.380] [3.247] [4.750] 
 Ret -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.045*** -0.234*** -0.233*** -0.182*** 
 
 
[-24.992] [-25.009] [-18.256] [-23.442] [-23.449] [-24.984] 
 MTBV 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.005* -0.003 -0.001 0.033*** 
 
 
[4.791] [5.187] [1.832] [-0.253] [-0.085] [4.877] 
 Turn -0.008* -0.007 0.006*** -0.018 -0.018 -0.007 
 
 
[-1.731] [-1.526] [3.283] [-1.213] [-1.257] [-1.639] 
 Vol -0.139*** -0.136*** 0.064*** -0.017 -0.018 -0.142*** 
 
 
[-11.136] [-10.889] [11.368] [-0.733] [-0.746] [-11.365] 
 Analyst -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.013*** 
 
 
[-5.754] [-4.516] [-3.779] [-1.378] [-1.126] [-5.516] 
 
        Observations 102007 102007 102007 20807 20807 102007 
 Adjusted R-
squared 0.382 0.383 0.244 0.308 0.309 0.382   
 43 
Table 2.5: Regression of Liquidity on Foreign Institutional Ownership: Subsample 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from the annual baseline panel regression specification:  
  ILLIQ firm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Own firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t 
ILLIQ is the logarithm of annual ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)), FI_Own is the % ownership of foreign institutional investors, γk,t is a country k, year t fixed 
effect and φfirm is a firm fixed effect. Subsamples are based on financial development (Developed, Emerging), ADR listing (ADR, Non-ADR), and geographic 
region (Asia, America, Europe). Variable definitions are in Table 1. The sample period is from 2000 to 2009. Robust t-statistics are presented in brackets.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6] [7]   
 
Developed Emerging   Non-ADR ADR   Asia America Europe 
 











[-8.216] [-5.296] [-11.206] 











[-12.948] [-8.273] [-5.303] 
 











[7.422] [4.304] [4.192] 











[-26.519] [-16.823] [-8.136] 











[-17.114] [-3.091] [-10.137] 











[-31.345] [-12.217] [-11.466] 











[11.098] [15.445] [13.459] 











[-17.484] [-7.756] [-13.323] 
 Observations 89391 38120   123538 3973   81246 9977 36288 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.937 0.920   0.941 0.902   0.936 0.908 0.873   
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Table 2.6: Difference in Difference Regressions 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from three regression specifications.  Columns [1] and 
[2] report the results from equation (1): 
  FI_Own i, t = α +β1*Qualified i, t+β2* Post 2002 i, t+β3* Qualified*Post2002i, t+Σjβj*Firm char.i,t +γk,t + ε i, t (1) 
where the dependant variable FI_Own is either the % share ownership of US tax-sensitive institutions (US 
Tax) which are defined to be all US-based mutual funds or US Pension funds (US Pension) and the 
independant variables are: Qualified is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a stock pays a dividend & is located 
in a tax-treaty country, Post 2002 is a dummy equal to 1 after 2002, Qualified*Post2002 is the interaction of the 
two variables, Firm char are seven firm characteristics described in Table 1, and γk is a country kfixed effect.  
Columns [3]-[4] replace the dependant variable with Liquidity as specified in Equation (2): 
  ILLIQi, t = α +β1*Qualified i, t+β2* Post 2002 i, t+β3* Qualified*Post2002i, t+Σjβj*Firm char.i,t +γk,t + ε i, t (2) 
where ILLIQ is measured as either the logarithm of annual ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)) or the 
logarithm of the Zeros trading cost measure.  The sample periods is from 2002 to 2004.  Robust t-statistics 
are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
 
US Tax US Pension Illiq Zeros 
 
Qualified -0.011 0.004 -0.093*** -0.040** 
 
 
[-0.894] [1.085] [-2.697] [-2.500] 
 Post 2002 0.025*** 0.000 -0.316*** -0.011 
 
 
[3.285] [0.057] [-15.314] [-1.480] 
 Qualified Dummy * Post2002 0.029*** -0.002 -0.281*** -0.143*** 
 
 
[2.903] [-0.677] [-10.387] [-12.839] 
 
Mktcap 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
 
[4.734] [3.034] [-6.158] [-4.841] 
 Mktcap2 -1.191*** -0.163*** 9.599*** 2.051*** 
 
 
[-4.369] [-2.999] [4.578] [4.014] 
 Ret 0.046*** 0.001 -0.630*** -0.137*** 
 
 
[5.581] [1.010] [-35.801] [-21.371] 
 MTBV 0.007 0.000 -0.171*** -0.083*** 
 
 
[1.331] [0.181] [-10.995] [-12.481] 
 Turn 0.028*** 0.002* -0.647*** -0.134*** 
 
 
[5.419] [1.691] [-34.947] [-22.263] 
 Vol -0.022* 0.002 1.358*** 0.047*** 
 
 
[-1.908] [0.815] [43.962] [3.001] 
 Analyst 0.034*** 0.005*** -0.233*** -0.068*** 
 
 
[14.603] [7.907] [-46.575] [-30.402] 
      Observations 34399 34399 34399 34399 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.106 0.052 0.654 0.513   
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Table 2.7A: Liquidity on Foreign Institutional Ownership: Geographical Determinant 
Description:  This table reportscoefficient estimates from the regression specification:  
  Illiq firm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Source firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t 
where ILLIQ is the logarithm of Amihud's ILLIQ measure, FIO_Source is the % share ownership of foreign 
institutional investors where Source is  either the region of origin (America, Asia, Europe) or development 
origin (US, Non-US Developed, Emerging). γk,t is a country k, year t fixed effect and φfirm is a firm fixed effect.  
Complete variable definitions are in Table 1.  The sample periods is from 2000 to 2009.  Robust t-statistics 
are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel A.  Institutional Sophistication 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
 
All Europe Asia America 
 
FIO_US -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.031*** 
 
 
[-6.582] [-3.613] [-3.168] [-3.628] 
 FIO_DevNonUS -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.030*** 
 
 
[-11.081] [-10.086] [-5.938] [-3.682] 
 FIO_Emg -0.001 0.033 -0.021 -0.091* 
 
 
[-0.086] [1.354] [-0.976] [-1.727] 
 
      Mktcap -0.205*** -0.147*** -0.348*** -0.707*** 
 
 
[-8.361] [-5.418] [-12.923] [-8.257] 
 Mktcap2 1.398*** 0.926*** 5.144*** 22.722*** 
 
 
[4.734] [4.237] [7.400] [4.299] 
 Ret -0.318*** -0.270*** -0.327*** -0.328*** 
 
 
[-21.527] [-8.137] [-26.545] [-16.869] 
 MTBV -0.202*** -0.169*** -0.233*** -0.084*** 
 
 
[-19.812] [-10.079] [-17.056] [-3.068] 
 Turn -0.249*** -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.651*** 
 
 
[-34.323] [-11.506] [-31.317] [-12.185] 
 Vol 0.397*** 0.392*** 0.286*** 1.127*** 
 
 
[20.524] [13.398] [11.052] [15.442] 
 Analyst -0.082*** -0.067*** -0.084*** -0.120*** 
 
 
[-23.532] [-13.274] [-17.463] [-7.733] 
 
      Observations 127511 36288 81246 9977 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.940 0.873 0.936 0.908   
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Table 2.7B: Liquidity on Foreign Institutional Ownership: Geographical Determinants 
Description:  This table reportscoefficient estimates from the regression specification:  
  Illiq firm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Source firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t 
where ILLIQ is the logarithm of Amihud's ILLIQ measure, FIO_Source is the % share ownership of foreign 
institutional investors where Source is  either the region of origin (America, Asia, Europe) or development 
origin (US, Non-US Developed, Emerging). γk,t is a country k, year t fixed effect and φfirm is a firm fixed effect.  
Complete variable definitions are in Table 1.  The sample periods is from 2000 to 2009.  Robust t-statistics 
are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel B. Geographical Proximity 
 
[5] [6] [7] 
 
 
Europe Asia America 
 FIO_US -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.031*** 
 
 
[-3.518] [-3.152] [-3.651] 
 FIO_Europe -0.039*** 
   
 
[-11.181] 
   FIO_NonEuro 0.015 
   
 
[1.185] 






















   
[-3.632] 
 Mktcap -0.144*** -0.348*** -0.707*** 
 
 
[-5.324] [-12.961] [-8.257] 
 
Mktcap2 0.910*** 5.141*** 22.739*** 
 
 
[4.190] [7.437] [4.300] 
 Ret -0.270*** -0.327*** -0.327*** 
 
 
[-8.133] [-26.525] [-16.829] 
 MTBV -0.169*** -0.234*** -0.085*** 
 
 
[-10.151] [-17.106] [-3.084] 
 Turn -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.651*** 
 
 
[-11.513] [-31.301] [-12.177] 
 Vol 0.392*** 0.286*** 1.126*** 
 
 
[13.407] [11.058] [15.410] 
 Analyst -0.067*** -0.084*** -0.120*** 
 
 
[-13.229] [-17.473] [-7.730] 
 Observations 36288 81246 9977 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.874 0.936 0.907   
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Table 2.8: Stock Liquidity and Institutional Investor Types 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression specification:  
  ILLIQ firm, t+1 = α + β1* FI_Source firm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm + ε firm, t 
where ILLIQ is the logarithm of the Amihud ILLIQ measure, FIO Bank, FIO Mutual, FIO Inves, FIO Insur and 
FIO Hedge are the % share ownership of foreign institutional investors classified as mutual funds, investment 
advisors, insurance and pension funds and hedge funds.   γk,t is a country k, year t fixed effect. φi is a firm fixed 
effect.  Complete variable definitions are in Table 1.  The sample periods is from 2000 to 2009.  Robust t-
statistics are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 





All Countries Developed Emerging   ADR Non-ADR 
 





[-11.556] [-10.693] [-4.002] 
 
[-3.533] [-10.555] 





[-8.326] [-7.416] [-3.713] 
 
[-1.071] [-8.134] 





[-2.586] [-1.926] [-1.896] 
 
[-0.429] [-2.731] 





[-1.423] [-1.142] [-2.951] 
 
[-2.444] [-1.319] 














[-8.269] [-6.324] [-6.252] 
 
[-4.491] [-8.008] 





[4.701] [4.238] [2.134] 
 
[3.601] [2.951] 





[-21.518] [-17.158] [-19.030] 
 
[-8.235] [-20.755] 





[-19.759] [-17.269] [-9.017] 
 
[-5.259] [-18.248] 





[-34.272] [-25.424] [-20.689] 
 
[-5.028] [-34.192] 





[20.623] [23.163] [0.049] 
 
[-1.253] [21.384] 









        Observations 127511 89391 38120   3973 123538 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.940 0.937 0.921   0.902 0.941   
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Table 2.9: Stock Liquidity and Information Environment 
Description:  This table reports coefficient estimates from the regression specification:   
  ILLIQ firm, t+1= α + β1* FI_Ownfirm, t + β2* FI_Own*Country Envfirm, t + Σjβj*Firm characteristicsfirm,t +γk,t +φ firm+ ε firm, 
t 
where ILLIQ is the logarithm of the Amihud ILLIQ measure, FI_Own is the % share ownership of foreign 
institutional investors, FI_Own*Country Env is the interaction of FI_Own and Country Environment Index which 
is equal to either: Accounting Standards (Acct), Anti Self Dealing Index (ANSI), Prevelance of Insider 
Trading (Insider) or Financial Disclosure (Disclose).  γk,t is a country k, year t fixed effect. φi is a firm fixed 
effect.  Complete variable definitions are in Table 1.  The sample periods is from 2000 to 2009.  Robust t-
statistics are presented in brackets.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
      FI_Own -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.026*** 
 
 
[-13.539] [-13.365] [-13.802] [-10.169] 
 FI_Own * Acct -0.014** 
    
 
[-2.075] 
    FI_Own * ANSI 
 
-0.012* 
   
  
[-1.935] 




   
[-2.122] 
  FI_Own * Disclose 
   
-0.011*** 
 
    
[-2.676] 
 Mktcap -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.205*** 
 
 
[-8.336] [-8.340] [-8.335] [-8.377] 
 Mktcap2 1.393*** 1.394*** 1.393*** 1.397*** 
 
 
[4.728] [4.729] [4.728] [4.734] 
 Ret -0.317*** -0.318*** -0.317*** -0.318*** 
 
 
[-21.500] [-21.504] [-21.493] [-21.529] 
 MTBV -0.202*** -0.203*** -0.202*** -0.203*** 
 
 
[-19.850] [-19.874] [-19.854] [-19.866] 
 Turn -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.248*** 
 
 
[-34.325] [-34.291] [-34.325] [-34.238] 
 Vol 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 
 
 
[20.524] [20.542] [20.523] [20.534] 
 Analyst -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 
 
[-23.514] [-23.555] [-23.493] [-23.557] 
 
      Observations 127511 127511 127511 127511 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940   
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Chapter 3: Mutual Fund Manager Disagreement 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial economists have long sought to understand how different pieces of 
information aggregate into prices. Traditional asset pricing models typically rely on a 
representative agent framework where investors possess homogenous beliefs. However, it 
is often noted that market participants hold differences of opinion even in situations when 
investors possess common information. This intriguing characteristic of financial markets 
has motivated a rapidly growing literature examining the role of heterogeneous beliefs on 
the formation of asset prices and equilibrium risk premia.  In light of this promising 
development, Hong and Stein (2007) proclaim that heterogeneous-agent models ‘represent 
the best horse on which to bet.’   
Yet, within this body of literature, a consensus of how heterogeneous beliefs affect 
asset prices remains elusive.  In a model with short-sale constraints, differences of opinion 
may lead to over-valuation since the stock price would reflect only the views of the 
optimists (Miller (1977), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002)). This over-valuation theory 
predicts lower future stock returns. Alternatively, if there are rational arbitrageurs or 
rational market makers who do not face these short sale constraints, prices would remain 
unbiased and there would be no relationship between differences of opinion and future 
returns (Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Hong and Stein (2003)).  On the other hand, 
rational models argue that differences of opinion imply a high level of information 
uncertainty or parameter uncertainty regarding a stock which would predict higher 
expected returns (Williams (1977), Barry and Brown (1985), Basak (2000), Buraschi and 
Jiltsov (2006)). These three theories - the overvaluation theory, arbitrageur theory and 
information uncertainty - present three alternative and empirically testable hypotheses. 
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Unfortunately, taking the theory to the data remains a considerable challenge due to 
the paucity of empirical measures for differences of opinion amongst investors. One of the 
most prominent measures is analyst forecast dispersion proposed in Diether, Malloy and 
Scherbina (2002). They find that stocks with high analyst forecast dispersion earn lower 
future stock returns.  The authors interpret this finding as support of the overvaluation 
hypothesis (Miller (1977)). However, alternative interpretations have been proposed which 
suggests that analyst dispersion may instead measure uncertainty about future cash flows 
(Johnson (2004)) or default risk (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009)). 
Furthermore, adaptations to this measure which control for forecast error (Doukas, Kim 
and Pantzalis (2006), Barron, Stanford and Yu (2008)), short or longer term forecasts 
(Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2005)), analyst incentives (Li and Hwang (2008)) or 
scaling issues (Cen, Wei and Zheng (2007)) find mixed or even contradictory results. The 
controversy surrounding the interpretation of analyst forecast dispersion compels a need 
for alternative empirical measures of differences of opinion. 
 In this chapter, I introduce a new measure of difference of opinion using the 
portfolio holdings of active mutual fund managers. First, I estimate a mutual fund 
manager’s belief of a stock’s expected returns as the difference between the fund portfolio 
weight and the benchmark weight. Black and Litterman (1992) show that a fund portfolio 
can be constructed as a full position in the benchmark plus a zero-cost long-short portfolio 
made up of the deviations from a benchmark.23 Hence, portfolio stock weights reveal the 
implied beliefs of the expected returns of these stocks. Mutual fund manager disagreement 
                                               
23 A number of recent studies have used this approach to study the performance of mutual funds.  Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) find that funds that actively deviate from their benchmarks outperform and exhibit 
strong performance persistence. Shumway, Szefler and Yuan (2009) show that mutual fund managers with 
correct beliefs persistently outperform.  Cohen, Polk and Silli (2009) use this methodology to isolate the best 
picks of each manager and find that portfolio of ‘best ideas’ generates excess returns.  Jiang, Verbeek and 
Wang (2011) find that stocks with the largest average tilt outperform stocks with low average tilts. 
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(MFD) is then calculated as the standard deviation in portfolio tilts scaled by the absolute 
value of the average tilt in a stock. 
Using this measure of differences of opinion, I analyze the role of disagreement 
amongst mutual fund managers in predicting the cross section of future stock returns. The 
evidence rejects the over-valuation hypothesis. In particular, a portfolio of stocks in the 
highest quintile of MFD outperforms stocks in the lowest quintile of MFD by 0.64% over 
the subsequent quarter after adjustments for size, book-to-market and momentum. The 
outperformance exhibits marginal significance under certain specifications. While the 
initial findings do not support the over-valuation hypothesis, the statistical evidence finds 
some support for the information uncertainty hypothesis. The results are found primarily in 
small cap, low book-to-market stocks which are stocks that are likely to have more 
information uncertainty. Interestingly, the portfolios returns are persistent and exhibit 
return continuation for up to a year (2.4%) after portfolio formation. 
An alternative interpretation of these findings is that the MFD measure captures 
valuable information possessed by mutual fund managers. Mutual fund holdings have been 
shown to predict future returns (Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Chen, Jegadeesh, and 
Wermers (2000), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002)) and in particular large positions have been 
shown to be especially profitable (Busse, Green and Baks (2007), Cohen, Polk, and Silli 
(2009)). To address the latter concern that large positions may skew the distribution of 
MFD, I truncate overweight tilts at twice the benchmark portfolio weight.  This creates an 
equal upper and lower bound for the MFD distribution.  I control for these mutual fund 
based information measures in Fama-MacBeth cross regressions.  The results are robust to 
both of these controls which suggest that it is unlikely that MFD proxies for information. 
This chapter contributes to an interesting and developing area of research that 
studies heterogeneous beliefs amongst investors by introducing a novel and intuitive 
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measure for differences of opinion. The MFD measure offers several attractive features 
over existing proxies of differences of opinion. First, mutual funds are an interesting venue 
to study and analyze differences of opinion. Fund managers are professional investors with 
access to large resources whose livelihoods are to make portfolio allocation decisions. 
Fund managers typically have a considerable amount of experience and expertise in asset 
management. Second, clear performance metrics are used to judge fund performance. Not 
only are managers benchmarked to widely reported indices, but they are also judged on the 
fund’s tracking error to ensure that funds are operating under their specified mandates. 
Third, mutual fund managers are compensated on the accuracy of their beliefs.  Good 
performance attracts fund flows which raises the assets under management.  In contrast, 
sell-side analysts may have other career incentives that bias their forecast projections.  For 
example, analysts may appease corporate management in an effort to maintain investment 
banking relations within the company.24 
The evidence in this chapter is most closely related to Cragg and Malkiel (1980). 
They collect proprietary expectations estimates from seventeen buy-side investment 
companies during the 1960s.  They find that the variance of expectations is positively 
related to future returns and interpret this to be consistent with a risk explanation.  I 
confirm their results in a later sample using a larger pool of investment managers. An 
additional benefit of this study is the public availability of mutual fund holdings which 
allows for further extensions and avenues for future research.  
This chapter develops as follows.  Section 2 explains the methodology used to elicit 
mutual fund manager beliefs.  Section 3 reports descriptive statistics and compares the 
                                               
24 Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010) find that sell-side analysts that were subsequently appointed to 
company positions would issue over-optimistic forecasts of the companies they covered. 
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MFD measure against previous measures of differences of opinion.  Section 4 presents the 
main results.  Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY  
3.2.1 Eliciting Manager Beliefs  
There are a number of methodologies for solving for the optimal portfolio that 
incorporate views and opinions that deviate from benchmark portfolio (Black and 
Litterman (1992), MacKinlay (1995), Brennan and Xia (2001)).  Given the holdings of a 
portfolio, we can reverse engineer the views and opinions of a mutual fund manager 
assuming that managers hold optimal portfolios.  For example, Shumway, Szefler and 
Yuan (2009) use the Black-Litterman model to elicit the views of fund managers to 
identify fund outperformance.  That methodology specifically takes into account the return 
covariance matrix of all stocks in the benchmark.  Cohen, Polk and Silli (2009) adopt the 
framework derived in MacKinlay (1995) to identify the ‘best idea’ from a manager’s 
holdings. 
To formalize how the beliefs of a fund manager can be extracted from portfolio 
holdings, I sketch below the Black-Litterman framework.  The Black-Litterman model 
starts with assumption that the benchmark portfolio represents equilibrium returns.  The 
equilibrium returns of the benchmark portfolio can be expressed as: 
Π = λ Σ ωbenchmark 
Π is the N x 1 vector of implied equilibrium excess returns, λ is the risk aversion 
coefficient, Σ is the N x N covariance matrix of excess returns and ωbenchmark is the N x 1 
weight of the assets in the benchmark.  Managers may have their own views of excess 
returns that are different from the implied equilibrium excess returns of the benchmark.  
Substituting in the manager’s views, µm, the manager chooses portfolio weights to 
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maximize the expected return over the benchmark while minimizing the tracking error.  
Assuming quadratic utility, the manager solves the unconstrained maximization problem 
where q represents his weight: 
2/)()'()'(max ωωλµω −∑−−−= qqq m
q
 
(q- ω)= (λ Σ) 
- 1
 µm 
)(Σ= 1 ωqλµm  
The manager’s beliefs, µm , can be expressed as a function of the manager-specific 
risk aversion, 
1−λ , covariance matrix of excess returns, Σ ,  and his deviations from the 
benchmark (q –ω).  For empirical tractability, we make the simplifying assumption that 
risk aversion is constant across managers, and Σ is a diagonal matrix that represents each 
stocks residual variance.  Then, a manager’s belief on a stock can be approximated by: 
)(2 ωσµ −≈ qm  
In this version, I make the decision to estimate a manager’s belief as the deviation 
from the benchmark.  This is a reasonable approximation since the aggregation of beliefs 
will be at the stock level and stock’s residual variance,
2σ , is constant for each stock.  For 
each fund portfolio f, I approximate each manager’s belief, µm, with the measure Tilt 
defined as the weight of a stock relative to the benchmark index.    
For each stock i, at time t:  
Tiltf,i,t = 
Portfolio
tifq ,, -  
IndexBenchmark































tifω ,, is weight of stock i in fund f and 
IndexBenchmark
tifω ,, is the corresponding weight in 
the fund’s benchmark index.  Portfolio weights that are greater than twice the benchmark 
are capped at twice the Benchmark Index weight for two reasons.  First, Cohen, Polk and 
Silli (2009) find that the single largest overweight position of active mutual funds 
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outperforms the market.25  Capping an overweight position at twice the benchmark weight 
insures that the measure does not simply capture their previously documented effect.  
Second, this truncation ensures that the measure is not driven by extreme outliers. 
Each fund’s benchmark index is selected using the Active Share methodology in 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) discussed in the next section. A stock that is in a benchmark 
index but not owned in the portfolio receives a Tilt equal to exactly negative the 
benchmark weight.26  A stock that is owned by a fund but is not a constituent member of 
the benchmark receives a Tilt equal to its portfolio weight. 
Next, I construct a measure of differences of opinion using the previously defined 
Tilt measure.  Mutual fund manager disagreement, MFD, is defined as the standard 
deviation of Tilt at the end of each quarter t, for each stock i, scaled by the absolute value 
of the average Tilt: 












/ )( ,, tifTiltmean  
I introduce two alternative measures of mutual fund manager disagreement that 
address potential pitfalls of the measure construction.  The first measure, MFD Zero, 
eliminates zero holding positions and incorporates only positive holding positions.  This 
measure alleviates the concern that non-holding positions may strongly influence the 
results.  The second measure, MFDVW, uses an alternative measure of Tilt based on the 
CRSP value-weighted index instead of the Active Share matched benchmarks. 
                                               
25 Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2009) isolate the single largest overweight positions from every active mutual fund 
from 1991 to 2005.  They find that the top 25% of these positions outperform by 1 to 4% per quarter.  
26 Since mutual funds are typically prohibited from short selling, this effectively creates a floor on the 
negative tilt of the stock (Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004)). 
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3.2.2 Data Selection 
The sample selection closely follows Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  I focus on all-
equity funds following the screening procedure used in Cremers and Petajisto (2009).27  
This procedure excludes bond funds, balanced and asset allocation funds, international 
funds, precious metals and sector funds.  I further limit the sample to only actively 
managed index funds by dropping index or closet index funds.  There are a total of 2355 
active funds in my sample.  The sample period starts from the first quarter 1990 and ends 
in the last quarter of 2006. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) use a total of 19 benchmarks from three index fund 
families (S&P, Russell and Wilshire).  In this analysis, I use 17 benchmarks.  The 
benchmarks include: S&P 500, S&P 500 Growth, S&P 500 Value, S&P400, S&P600 
Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Russell 3000 and Russell Midcap including the value and 
growth components of each.  I omit the Wilshire 5000 and Wilshire 4500 indices due to the 
large number of stocks in each index.  The large number of stocks in these benchmarks 
implies small weights for each index constituent which could bias the construction of the 
measure of manager dispersion.  This issue is also a concern for the other index 
benchmarks.  Managers do not typically hold all the stocks in the benchmark index due the 
high transactions costs of maintaining those positions.  The results are not significantly 
different if the bottom 10% of smallest stocks within each benchmark is omitted.   
A fund’s benchmark is selected by computing the lowest Active Share with respect 
to all the benchmarks following Cremers and Petajisto (2009). This approach matches the 
portfolio holdings of the mutual fund to the closest index benchmark during a given 
                                               
27 The screening procedure requires a fund to meet the following criteria:   A fund must have a Wiesenberg 
objective code of growth, growth and income, equity income, growth with current income, maximum capital 
gains, small capitalization growth or missing.  Next, the funds must also have an ICDI fund objective code of 
aggressive growth, growth and income, income, long-term growth, or missing.  Finally, a fund must have a 
Spectrum investment objective code of aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, unclassified or 
missing. 
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quarter.  This methodology is preferred to a return-matching regression methodology 
because it can be estimated each quarter, when daily mutual fund returns may be 
unavailable and eliminates the possibility of matching to an unlikely benchmark. The data 
for fund benchmarks is obtained directly from Petajisto’s website.28   
The data on stock holdings are from the CDA/Spectrum mutual funds holdings 
database by Thomson Financial.  To remain conservative, I do not carry forward holdings 
for quarters where mutual funds do not report.  The stocks are matched to CRSP.  The data 
on stock returns and trading volume are from CRSP.  The sample is limited to common 
stocks in the United States with share codes 10 or 11.  To avoid microstructure effects and 
limited mutual fund ownership, the sample only includes stocks with market 
capitalizations above the 20% NYSE decile and greater than $5 as of the previous quarter 
end.  Using the previous quarter as a cutoff insures against potential selection issues. To be 
included in the sample, the stock must appear in a benchmark index and must have a 
holding position by at least two mutual fund managers to estimate the dispersion measure.   
I construct the following stock characteristic variables as controls.  Mktcap is the 
logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of quarter t.  B/M is the logarithm of the 
book-to-market ratio at the end of quarter t.  The book-to-market ratio is industry adjusted 
following Wermers (2004).  Turnover is the share turnover standardized by the average 
stock turnover of the firm's exchange (NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ).  Risk adjustment is 
performed using DGTW characteristic portfolio returns following Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2004).29 
                                               
28 http://www.petajisto.net/data.html 
29 The DGTW benchmarks are available via 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm 
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I construct two popular measures of differences of opinion for comparison with the 
MFD measure.30 Analyst dispersion is calculated as the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast following Diether, Malloy 
and Scherbina (2002). An alternative measure for analyst dispersion is calculated scaling 
by price following Garfinkel (2009).  Second, Garfinkel (2009) proposes that quarterly 
unexplained turnover can proxy for differences of opinion.  DTO, the unexplained change 
in turnover, is calculated as the difference between the current quarter turnover and the 
turnover of the trailing six months. 
There is substantial evidence that mutual funds possess valuable information.  
Various studies have documented that mutual fund holdings predict positive future excess 
returns.31  To insure that the MFD measure is capturing disagreement and not information, 
I calculate three of the most prominent holdings based measures to control for potential 
information effects. 
1. MFOwn.  This measure is calculated as the fraction of shares held by mutual funds for 
each stock following Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000). 
2. ∆ Breadth.  Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) count the number of mutual funds that hold a 
position in a stock scaled by total number of mutual funds.  For each stock, the 
breadth measure is the quarterly change in the number of mutual funds with a 
position in the stock. 
3.3  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample.  The sample is composed 
of larger stocks compared to the full CRSP stock universe.  This reflects the fact that 
                                               
30 Goetzmann and Massa (2005) 
31 These studies include: Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1992), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008) 
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stocks in benchmark indices tend to be larger stocks.  Additionally, I exclude stocks priced 
below $5 and stocks smaller than the 2nd NYSE decile as of the previous quarter end. To 
calculate the disagreement measure, a stock must have more than one mutual fund position 
to be included in the sample. 
Table 3.2 presents correlation tables of the key variables used in the study.  The top 
diagonal represents rank-order Spearman correlations while the bottom diagonal represents 
Pearson correlations.  Since the unit value of the MFD measure is a relative measure 
amongst stocks and lacks meaningful economic interpretation, the Spearman correlations 
may reveal more about how it is related to other key variables. The correlation table is 
separated into three panels.  Panel A presents correlations with other difference of opinion 
measures.  The MFD measure has low correlations with other measures of difference of 
opinion.  It is negatively correlated with analyst dispersion (Spearman rank correlation = -
0.07) and positively correlated with turnover (Spearman rank correlation = 0.11).  Panel B 
presents correlations with measures of information.  MFD tends to more highly correlated 
with level measures (Breadth and MFOwn) than with change measures.  Overall, the 
correlations are relatively low with these information proxies with the highest Spearman 
rank correlation of 0.30 with Breadth.  Panel C presents correlations with stock 
characteristics.  Since the overall correlations with stock characteristics are relatively low, I 
sort stocks into MFD quintiles to observe stocks characteristics within each quintile. 
Table 3.3 presents average stock characteristics across each MFD quintile. To 
construct the MFD quintiles, stocks are first assigned into five size groups based on market 
capitalization at the end of the previous quarter. Then, within each size quintile, stocks are 
dependently sorted into five additional groups based on MFD.  This sorting procedure is 
adapted from Chen, Hong and Stein (2002). This procedure is performed to address the 
concern that MFD has greater variation across large stocks.  A simple unconditional 
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sorting on MFD unconditional on size would create quintiles where the extreme portfolios 
would be predominantly large stocks. 
Stocks in the high MFD quintile have lower book-to-market ratios and higher 
turnover and unexplained turnover (DTO) than stocks in the low MFD quintile.  This is 
consistent with the intuition that disagreement is related to turnover and disagreement is 
likely to occur when information uncertainty is high as is the case with low book-to-market 
stocks.  Consistent with earlier correlation results, analyst dispersion is lower amongst high 
MFD stocks. Mutual fund information measures are positively associated with MFD 
quintiles. 
Figure 3.1 plots the values of MFD in the two quarters preceding and after 
portfolio sorting. MFD values in the extreme quintiles are higher during the quarter of 
portfolio formation but it shows that stocks tend to exhibit persistent MFD.  This suggests 
that MFD tends to be a firm level characteristic that reflects an underlying disagreement 
surround the stock. 
3.4 RESULTS 
This section presents the main tests of the various theories that predict a relation 
between differences of opinion and future stock returns.  The goal is to determine whether 
MFD contains information about future stock returns.  First, I use Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions to draw conclusions about MFD and future returns.  The 
regressions include controls for firm characteristics and information proxies to help 
distinguish the effect of mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD). Next, stocks are 
assigned into portfolios based on firm characteristics to deliver insights on which types of 
stocks the MFD effect is most prominent.  Finally, I perform a thorough analysis of the 
timing of portfolio returns for both short and longer horizons. 
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3.4.1 Regression Analysis 
I estimate a series of Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to 
illustrate the relation between mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD) and future stock 
returns. The regressions are estimated each quarter and the coefficient estimate are 
averaged over time. I include lagged values of market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, 
turnover and momentum (past 6 month returns).  The standard errors are adjusted 
following Newey-West with up to 8 lags. 
Table 3.4 presents the results of these regressions using various specifications.  
Columns [1]-[3] present estimates of MFD, MFDzeros, and MFDvw and firm characteristics 
on stock returns over the next quarter. MFD is a significant valuation indicator while 
MFDzeros is marginally significantly related to returns over the next quarter. MFDvw is not 
significantly related to future returns which indicates that identifying accurate fund 
benchmarks is important to calculating the differences in opinion measure. 
Next I test whether MFD predicts future returns in excess of existing measures of 
differences of opinion. I estimate two sets of results for equal weighted and valued 
weighted regressions. Value weighted regressions are estimated by weighting the 
regression by market capitalization. Columns [4]-[5] present the equal weighted results 
with analyst dispersion and unexpected turnover (DTO). The coefficient estimates for 
analyst dispersion are negative and statistically significant which is consistent with the 
findings in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). The inclusion of these differences of 
opinion measures renders the effect of MFD marginally significant. Columns [6]-[7] 
present the value weighted results with the inclusion of analyst dispersion and unexpected 
turnover (DTO).  Value weighting produces an interesting effect in that MFD is positive 
and statistically significant.  Unexpected turnover (DTO) is also statistically significant in 
this specification. On the other hand, analyst dispersion is statistically insignificant in the 
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value-weighted regression specification.  The weaker significance of value-weighting on 
analyst dispersion is consistent with the findings in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) 
which documents that the effect of analyst dispersion is primarily in smaller stocks. 
These initial results warrant further discussion.  For all specifications, the findings 
are inconsistent with over-valuation theory of Miller (1977) that predicts that differences of 
opinion are negatively related to future returns. The results though are not strongly 
significant across all specification although the coefficient estimate for MFD is 
consistently positive. The regressions do not overturn the empirically negative relationship 
between analyst dispersion and future returns rather it brings to question whether analyst 
dispersion proxies for differences of opinion in light of MFD coefficient estimate.  A 
remaining concern is that mutual fund manager disagreement measure MFD may also be a 
poor measure for differences of opinion as it may capture information effects from mutual 
fund holding positions documented in the previous literature.   
The results reported in Table 3.4 panel B casts doubt on the interpretation of 
mutual fund manager disagreement as a proxy for information.  Specifically, the findings 
indicate that the inclusion of mutual fund information proxies do not significantly alter the 
effect of MFD on future returns. The coefficient estimates on MFD remain positive and 
statistically significant.  These results suggest that the mutual fund manager disagreement 
MFD can be interpreted as a measure for differences in opinion amongst investors. 
3.4.2 Sorting by Firm Characteristics 
To identify how MFD operates as a valuation indicator, I analyze which types of 
stocks the MFD effect is the strongest.  I create portfolios formed using dependant sorts 
based on stock characteristics and MFD to observe average future returns. The stock 
characteristics are market capitalization, book-to-market ratio and past 6 months return.  
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These characteristics are reliably shown to capture the cross section of stock returns (Fama 
and French (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).  
Table 3.5 presents the results of equal weighted average portfolio returns using 
dependent sorts based on stock characteristics and MFD. Each quarter, stocks are sorted 
into 3 bins based their characteristic (market capitalization, industry-adjusted book-to-
market ratio, and past 6 month stock return).  Within each bin, stocks are further sorted 
into 3 bins based on their MFD measure.  The stocks are held for the following year and 
the cumulative raw returns are reported.32  The t-statistics are adjusted using Newey-West 
correction with up to 8 lags. 
The results in the left panel of Table 3.5 indicate that the ability of the MFD 
measure to forecast future stock returns is found primarily in smaller stocks. Within the 
smallest stocks quintile of the sample, the high MFD stocks outperform low MFD stocks 
by 1.75% annually although the differences are marginally significant.  The high-low MFD 
spread is smaller for mid-cap and large-cap stocks.  The middle panel of Table 3.5 reports 
the results of sorts based on the book-to-market ratio.  High MFD stocks outperform low 
MFD stocks only amongst low B/M stocks.  The right panel of Table 3.5 reports sorts 
based on past 6 month returns and MFD. The high-low MFD spread is increasing in past 
stock returns but is statistically insignificant. 
These finding reveal interesting insights into the source of MFD as a valuation 
indicator.  Closer inspection shows that the MFD return effect is primarily found in small, 
glamour stocks which are different than the analyst dispersion effect which is concentrated 
in smaller distressed stocks (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009)).  Low MFD 
stocks tend to have particularly poor performance relative to other stocks in the same size 
and book-to-market groups.  Interestingly, low MFD stocks are unlikely to be stocks that 
                                               
32 The results are similar using 3, 6, and 9 month horizons. 
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mutual funds avoid.  Rather the characteristics of low MFD stocks in Table 3.3 indicate 
that mutual funds tend to be overweight low MFD stocks. 
Figure 3.2 presents a time-series plot of a long-short trading strategy that trades 
long the top MFD portfolio and shorts the bottom portfolio over the sample period.  The 
portfolios are held for 3 months and reformed at the end of each quarter.  The figure 
reports annualized returns. The results show that the strategy is particularly profitable 
particularly during the dot-com bust when small glamour stocks performed poorly. 
3.4.3 Timing of Returns 
The information uncertainty hypothesis predicts that stocks with larger differences 
of opinion should have higher expected returns to compensate for risk. Since MFD is 
highly persistent, these models should predict return continuation if the fundamental risks 
of the stock do not change.  In this section, I explore the timing of future returns using 
portfolio sorts. 
Table 3.6 presents the future six month DGTW risk-adjusted returns on five 
portfolios sorted on MFD for equal-weighted (Panel A) and value-weighted portfolios 
(Panel B).  The return differential between high- and low-MFD stocks increases every 
month for the subsequent six months for both equal and value weighted portfolios.  The 
return spread is statistically significant for holding periods of three months or longer. The 
return continuation persists even after six months and lasts as long as one year.  Figure 3.3 
plots the DGTW returns of high- and low-MFD portfolios for a year out.  Panel A reports 
equal-weighted portfolios, panel B reports value-weighted portfolios and panel C presents 
an equal-weighted portfolio using the alternative MFDzeros measure. In all three panels, the 
high MFD portfolio outperforms the low MFD portfolio over the next full year. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter addresses the debate surrounding the importance of heterogeneous 
beliefs on asset prices by introducing a new measure of differences of opinion based on 
mutual fund manager beliefs.  Recent theories examine the role of differences of opinion 
on asset prices but offer different cross-sectional predictions. The new measure constructed 
in this chapter attempts to shed light on this debate.   
The results indicate that stocks with higher mutual fund manager disagreement 
(MFD) earn higher future returns than low MFD stocks. I find that this return continuation 
persists up to a year. This result rejects the over-valuation hypothesis of Miller (1977) and 
is at odds with alternative measures of differences of opinion such as dispersion in 
analyst’s forecasts.  Instead, I interpret the evidence presented in this chapter to be in-line 
with information uncertainty theories.  
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Figure 3.2: Time Series of Long-Short Portfolio of Mutual Fund Manager Dispersion 













1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 68 
Figure 3.3A: Cumulative Abnormal (DGTW) Adjusted Returns from Portfolio Formation - 
Panel A. Equal Weighted Portfolios formed on MFD 
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Table 3.1: Sample Statistics 
Description:  The sample includes common stocks from the CRSP database that are listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with a market capitalization above the 20th NYSE breakpoint and 
with a price greater than $5 at the end of the prior quarter. To be included in the sample, the stock 
must be owned by more than 1 mutual fund.  The data for mutual funding holdings is from 
Thomson and includes only active mutual funds following the screening procedure described in 
Cremers and Petajesto (2009).  The # of mutual funds, # of Stocks and average market 
capitalization are tallied at the end of each year. 
  
Year # of Mutual Funds # of Stocks 
Average Market 
Capitalization 
1990 290 1542 1785 
1991 339 1820 2041 
1992 396 2002 2049 
1993 402 2136 2182 
1994 495 2286 2032 
1995 520 2503 2511 
1996 756 2779 2825 
1997 691 2706 3780 
1998 791 2677 4723 
1999 1033 2790 5934 
2000 957 2946 5213 
2001 919 2350 5664 
2002 1068 2143 4840 
2003 1125 2216 6222 
2004 1293 2031 7340 
2005 1178 2188 7451 




Table 3.2A: Correlation Table 
Description:  This table presents correlations of the key variables used in this paper.  The top 
diagonal reports Pearson correlations and the bottom diagonal reports Spearman correlations.  
Panel A presents correlations across differences of opinion proxies.  Panel B presents correlations 
across information proxies.  Panel C presents correlations across firm characteristics.  MFD is the 
mutual fund manager disagreement measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock 
tilt scaled by the absolute value of the average tilt where tilt is defined as the managers' deviation 
from their benchmark index, adjusted for large overweights (see text).  Analyst Dispersion is the 
dispersion of analysts forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast following 
Diether, Malloy, Scherbina (2002). Analyst dispersion (P) is the dispersion of analysts forecasts 
scaled by price following Garfinkel (2009).      TURN (Q/M) is the turnover of the stock over the 
past quarter/month.  DTO is the quarterly unexplained turnover calculated following Garkinkel 
(2009). GT is average portfolio weight across all mutual funds for each stock calculated following 
Grinblatt and Titman (1993).  Breadth is the total number of mutual funds that hold a position in 
the stock as a percentage of the total number of mutual funds at the time.  ∆ Breadth is the 
change in the number of mutual funds holding the stock scaled by the number of mutual funds 
holding the stock at q-1.  MFOwn is the total % share ownership by all active mutual funds.  
Trade is the change in MFOwn from quarter t-1 to t.   B/M is the industry adjusted book to 
market ratio as defined in Wermers (2004).  MktCap is the total market capitalization.  MOM is 
the past 6 month stock return.  % Funds Overweight is the number of funds overweight the 
stock divided by the number of funds who have the stock in their benchmark.  












Mean 14.49 0.11 0.01 0.32 0.11 0.00 
STD 38.61 0.29 0.56 0.35 0.12 0.08 
N 157,176 110,410 110,417 98,828 98,828 98,799 
MFD 
1 -0.07 -0.08 0.11 0.11 0.02 
Analyst Disp -0.01 1 0.87 0.16 0.16 -0.01 
Analyst Disp (P) 0.00 0.02 1 0.06 0.06 0.00 
TURN (Q) 0.02 0.09 0.01 1 0.95 0.00 
TURN (M) 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.91 1 0.20 





Table 3.2B: Correlation Table Continued 








Mean 14.49 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00   
STD 38.61 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04   
N 157,176 157,176 155,249 157,176 155,249  
  
MFD 1 0.30 0.05 0.28 0.05 
  Breadth 0.03 1 0.14 0.56 0.07 
  
∆ Breadth 0.01 0.10 1 0.11 0.41 
  
FracOwn 0.07 0.25 0.10 1 0.28 
  
Trade 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.31 1 
  
                
        
        Panel C. Stock Characteristics 
  




Mean 14.49 0.58 4287.12 1.10 4.38 0.92  
STD 38.61 0.48 15815.98 0.40 7.11 0.11  
N 157,176 118,867 157,176 157,131 157,176 157,176   
MFD 1 -0.06 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.05 
 BM -0.02 1 -0.16 0.07 -0.30 0.05 
 
Mktcap 0.00 -0.09 1 0.14 0.07 -0.30 
 
MOM 0.00 0.04 0.01 1 0.02 0.01 
 




0.04 0.02 -0.26 0.03 0.04 1 
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of Stocks Sorted on Mutual Fund Manager Disagreement 
Description:  This table reports the average stock characteristics of mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD) quintiles.  The quintiles are 
formed each quarter from 1990 to 2006 by ranking stocks based on MFD relative to other stocks in their size quintile from the previous 
quarter. MFD is the mutual fund manager disagreement measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock tilt scaled by the 
absolute value of the average tilt where tilt is defined as the managers' deviation from their benchmark index, adjusted for large overweights 
(see text). MktCap is the logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of quarter t.  B/M is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio at 
the end of quarter t.  MOM is the past 6 month stock return. TURN is the quarterly share turnover standardized by the average stock 
turnover of the firm's exchange (NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ).  DTO is the quarterly unexplained turnover calculated following Garkinkel 
(2009).  Analyst disp is the standard deviation of analysts forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast calculated following 
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). # of Funds Hold is the number of mutual funds holding the stock at t.  ∆ Breadth is the change in 
the breadth of mutual fund ownership for a stock from quarter t-1 to t.  % Funds Overweight is the # of funds that hold overweight 
positions divided by the total number of funds in which is the stock is in their benchmark. 
              
 














Mean 14.4 4198 0.59 1.10 32% 
-
0.01% 




             
Low 
0.9 3420 0.61 1.10 28% -
0.41% 
0.13 15.7 -0.05% 5.1% 0.5827 
  
2 
2.2 3894 0.62 1.10 32% -
0.01% 
0.12 27.6 0.00% 7.3% 0.2274 
  3 4.4 4604 0.58 1.10 34% 0.12% 0.11 33.9 0.07% 9.0% 0.1826 
  4 9.0 4643 0.57 1.11 34% 0.17% 0.10 35.0 0.08% 9.4% 0.1702 
  High 55.4 4432 0.57 1.10 33% 0.08% 0.11 34.1 0.05% 9.0% 0.1565 
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Table 3.4A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Future Quarterly Return on MFD 
Description:  This table presents coefficient estimates of quarterly Fama-MacBeth cross sectional regressions of future 
quarterly return on mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD).  MFD is the mutual fund manager disagreement 
measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock tilt scaled by the absolute value of the average tilt where 
tilt is defined as the managers' deviation from their benchmark index, adjusted for large overweights (see text).   
B/M is the industry adjusted book to market ratio as defined in Wermers (2004).  MktCap is the total market 
capitalization.  MOM is the past 6 month stock return.   The t-statistics (in parenthesis) are reported in parenthesis 
and are adjusted using the Newey-West estimator with up to 8 lags. 
Panel A.  Difference of Opinion Proxies 
 
Dependant Variable:  Cumulative Raw Return over next 1 Quarter 
 
 

















     
 
 
MFDvw   
-0.001 





    
 
 
Disagreement Proxy        
 
 


























Firm Characteristics        
 
 
Mktcap -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
  
(-0.36) (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.13) (-0.2) (0.2) (-0.07) 
 
 
B/M 0.597* 0.592* 0.602* 0.542 0.578 0.430 0.386 
 
  
(1.74) (1.73) (1.76) (1.61) (1.67) (0.95) (0.87) 
 
 
TURN -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 0.095 0.126 
 
  
(-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.16) (0.85) (1.31) 
 
 
RET (t-1) -4.313* -4.316* -4.316* -3.819 -4.404* -2.868 -3.549 
 
  
(-1.7) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-1.36) (-1.72) (-0.97) (-1.22) 
 
 
MOM6 1.268 1.274 1.271 1.502 1.508* 0.849 1.383* 
 
  
(1.36) (1.36) (1.36) (1.38) (1.7) (1.21) (1.94) 
 
 
Intercept 6.985* 6.905* 6.997* 6.040 6.793* 5.472 6.231* 
 
  
(1.99) (1.98) (1.99) (1.55) (1.98) (1.58) (1.89) 
 
 





0.065*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.128*** 0.132*** 
 
 
(5.12) (5.48) (5.42) (5.6) (5.51) (6.83) (7.11) 
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Table 3.4B: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Future Quarterly Return on MFD 
Description:  This table presents coefficient estimates of quarterly Fama-MacBeth cross sectional 
regressions of future quarterly return on mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD).  MFD is the 
mutual fund manager disagreement measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock 
tilt scaled by the absolute value of the average tilt where tilt is defined as the managers' deviation 
from their benchmark index, adjusted for large overweights (see text).   B/M is the industry 
adjusted book to market ratio as defined in Wermers (2004).  MktCap is the total market 
capitalization.  MOM is the past 6 month stock return.   The t-statistics (in parenthesis) are 
reported in parenthesis and are adjusted using the Newey-West estimator with up to 8 lags. 
Panel B.  Information Proxies 
Dependant Variable:  Cumulative Raw Return over next 1 Quarter 
 
  [1] [2]     
MFD 0.001** 0.001** 
 
 
 (2.36) (2.47) 
 
 
      
 
Information Proxies 
    
 















    
 



































      
 
Adjusted R-Square 0.067*** 0.068***     
 
(5.25) (5.27)     
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Table 3.5: Portfolio Returns Sorted by Firm Characteristics and Mutual Fund Manager Disagreement 
Description:  This table reports future annual average portfolio returns of stocks sorted into groups based on stock characteristics and mutual 
fund manager disagreement (MFD). At the end of each quarter, stocks are first ranked into three characteristics groups based on either market 
capitalization, book-to-market or momentum (past six months return).  Within each characteristic group, stocks are sorted into three additional 
groups based on their MFD.  An equal weighted porfolio is formed and held over the following 12 months.  MFD is the mutual fund manager 
disagreement measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock tilt scaled by the absolute value of the average tilt where tilt is 
defined as the managers' deviation from their benchmark index, adjusted for large overweights (see text).  The t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis and are adjusted using the Newey-West estimator with up to 8 lags. 
Mean Returns 
         













 Small Cap Mid   Cap Large Cap  Low       BM 
Medium       
BM 
High           
BM 
 Loser Medium Winner 
MFD     
Low 13.74% 13.76% 14.14% 
 
10.83% 14.95% 17.50% 
 
11.64% 14.62% 16.27% 
Medium 15.44% 14.86% 13.95% 
 
13.33% 15.09% 17.47% 
 
13.14% 14.50% 16.17% 
High 15.50% 15.02% 14.44% 
 
13.66% 15.34% 16.70% 
 
12.32% 14.86% 17.48% 
            High-Low 1.75% 1.26% 0.31% 
 
2.83% 0.40% -0.80% 
 
0.69% 0.24% 1.22% 




Table 3.6: Portfolio Returns Sorted on Mutual Fund Manager Disagreement 
Description:  This table reports future average portfolio returns of mutual fund manager disagreement (MFD) 
quintiles. At the end of each quarter, stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their MFD relative to stock in their 
previous quarter size quintile.  An equal weighted porfolio is formed and held over the following 6 months.  
Panel A presents equal-weighted portfolios of DGTW (1997) characteristics adjusted returns. Panel B presents 
value-weighted portfolios of DGTW (1997) characteristics adjusted returns. MFD is the mutual fund manager 
disagreement measured as the standard deviation of each manager's stock tilt scaled by the absolute value of the 
average tilt where tilt is defined as the managers' deviation from their benchmark index, adjusted for large 
overweights (see text).  The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are adjusted using the Newey-West 
estimator with up to 8 lags. 
Panel A:  Equal Weighted Cumulative DGTW Adjusted Returns 
 





0.0003 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0030 -0.0049 
 
 
0.16 -0.01 -0.32 -0.58 -0.94 -1.46 
 
 
2 0.0013 0.0031 0.0021 0.0025 0.0030 0.0026 
 
  
0.81 1.75 1.02 1.00 1.15 0.96 
 
 
3 0.0009 0.0026 0.0018 0.0021 0.0024 0.0035 
 
  
0.55 1.69 1.02 1.20 1.21 1.71 
 
 
4 0.0014 0.0036 0.0048 0.0053 0.0055 0.0056 
 
  





0.0022 0.0033 0.0044 0.0044 0.0058 0.0059 
 
 





0.0019 0.0033 0.0052 0.0062 0.0088 0.0108 
 
 
1.18 1.66 2.31 1.95 2.33 2.61 
 Panel B:  Value Weighted Cumulative DGTW Adjusted Returns 
 





0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0074 -0.0093 
 
 
0.05 -1.04 -2.00 -2.39 -3.18 -3.64 
 
 
2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0014 0.0008 0.0018 
 
  
0.30 0.19 0.26 0.48 0.20 0.46 
 
 
3 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0012 
 
  
-0.39 0.09 -0.27 -0.06 -0.28 -0.56 
 
 
4 0.0016 0.0033 0.0036 0.0028 0.0031 0.0026 
 
  





0.0028 0.0034 0.0019 0.0040 0.0045 0.0041 
 
 





0.0027 0.0055 0.0064 0.0096 0.0120 0.0134 
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